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EXPORTING THE RULE OF LAW To MONGOLIA: POSTSOCIALIST LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORMS
SEBASTIAN R. ASTRADA*

This article analyzes Mongolia's legal andjudicial reforms and the efforts of
international organizations and outside states to assist or encourage those
reforms. Most internationalorganizationsand outside states predicate their legal
assistance on establishing the "rule of law, " but they rarely operate from a
developed definition of this concept. This article analyzes what the concept of
"rule of law" commonly means, and establishes a cogent and tangible, and
procedurally-minimalist, rule of law definition. This article then uses this
formulation to analyze Mongolia's legal and judicial reforms. Mongolia's
experiences demonstrate four important best practices for future rule of law
promotion: (1) judicial independence is the cornerstone of the rule of law; (2)
formal government action plans offer "more bang for your buck; " (3) public
participationand sentiment is a proxy for the institutionalizationof the norms and
culture of the rule of law; and (4) the leverage of donor coordination pays
dividends.
I. INTRODUCTION

From the time of its independence on July 11, 1921,1 and throughout 70 years
as a socialist state, Mongolia was something of an enigma to the rest of the world,
having withdrawn inward. Mongolia engaged in diplomatic relations almost
exclusively with one state: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R. or
Soviet Union).2 Then, after the Sino-Soviet split, Mongolia primarily acted under
Soviet direction as a buffer state between the U.S.S.R. and its other large
communist neighbor, China.3 During that time, only the U.S.S.R. knew anything
about Mongolia and its people. 4 Mongolia stumbled onto the world scene during
the remarkable antecedents which led to the dismantling of the Soviet Union and

* Sebastian R. Astrada, J.D., American University, Washington College of Law; M.A. in International
Affairs with a concentration in International Politics, American University, School of International
Service. Mr. Astrada worked at the Supreme Court of Mongolia in the summer of 2005. Mr. Astrada is
an attorney at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in Washington D.C. The views
expressed in this article are solely the views of the author and should not be attributed to the Supreme
Court of Mongolia or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
1. Thomas E. Ewing, Russia, China, and the Origins of the Mongolian People's Republic, 19111921: A Reappraisal,58 SLAVONIC & E. EUR. REV. 399, 421 (1980).
2. Henry S. Bradsher, The Sovietization of Mongolia, 50 FOREIGN AFF. 545, 548 (1971-1972);
Tom Ginsburg, PoliticalReform in Mongolia: Between Russia and China, 35 ASIAN SURV. 459, 459
(1995).
3. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 461.
4. See Bradsher,supranote 2, at 548.
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its satellites. Only then did the world awaken to Mongolia and its status as an
independent state.
Following the lead of the former satellites, in 1990, Mongolia undertook a
joint transition from socialism and a centrally-planned economy to democracy and
a free-market economy.6 At its outset, the parliamentary leaders envisioned a
sustainable and modest transition. After the transition began with a basic
amendment to the Constitution to provide for a multi-party state, subsequent events
enlarged the initial scope of the shift.7
Put simply, Mongolia collapsed.
Mongolia's economic implosion and social structure dissolution resulted from a
unique combination: Eastern Europe's rejection of communism; the Soviet
Union's disintegration; the resultant destruction of the Soviet trading bloc, the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA"); and the Soviet Union's
cessation of aid to Mongolia.' As a result, Mongolia probably suffered the worst
peacetime economic collapse of any nation this century.9 By the time the dust
settled, the transition had to undertake the goal of completely rebuilding all of
Mongolia's internal structures.
As a result, Mongolia's leaders lacked the advantage of gradual change.
Instead, they chose a "shock therapy" approach by opening its borders, dismantling
trade barriers, ceasing price controls, and privatizing the state's holdings.10
Throughout this process, over the last twenty years, Mongolia received massive
influxes of donor aid in the form of human, technological and financial capital."
Surprisingly, Mongolia's transition has been lauded as achieving remarkable
success; and its institutions are democratic, widely-established and domestically
and internationally respected.12 However, Mongolia still cannot stand on sturdy
legs if the support of donor aid is reduced or retracted.
In order for the government of Mongolia to understand how foreign aid
influences its economy, society and government, and what level of dependence or
interaction exists, this article addresses certain questions. How did foreign aid
influence, assist and advance Mongolia's legal transition? Was foreign aid
predicated on a firm understanding of what Mongolia's economy and legal system
needed, or did foreign donors merely advance general, and western notions of
legal, democratic and capitalistic reforms? Are these systems appropriate for the
Mongolian people, its culture and its institutional history?
5. Julia S. Bilskie & Hugh M. Arnold, An Examinationof the Politicaland Economic Transition
of Mongolia Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 19 J. OF THIRD WORLD STUD. 205, 209 (2002).
6. See, e.g., Ginsburg,supra note 2, at 459; id.
7. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 209.
8. Id. at 211.
9. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 459.
10. See e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 465; Tae Ming Cheung, The Cure Hurts, 153 FAR E.
EcoN. REv. 70, 71-72 (1991); Hari D. Goyal, A Development Perspective on Mongolia, 39 ASIAN
SURV. 633, 635-43 (1999); Bilskie & Arnold, supranote 5, at 211-12.
11. Goyal, supra note 10, at 647.
12. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
(November 21, 2005), available at http://www.mongolianembassy.us/mongolia and usa/us_presidents
visit to mongolia.
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Most international organizations and outside states predicate their legal
assistance on establishing the "rule of law," but they rarely operate from a wellthought definition of this concept. This article analyzes what the concept of "rule
of law" commonly means, and establishes a cogent and tangible rule of law
definition. This article then uses this procedurally-minimalist formulation to
analyze Mongolia's post-socialist rule of law reforms that focus on the judiciary in
particular.1 3
This article is divided into five parts. Part II discusses the concept of the rule
of law and conceives of an appropriate rule of law formulation for post-socialist or
transitional states. Part III provides a brief summary of Mongolia's institutional
background. Pursuant to the procedurally-minimalist rule of law definition that
this article establishes, Part IV addresses Mongolia's legal and judicial reforms and
the efforts of international organizations, states and domestic NGOs to assist or
encourage those reforms, and identifies lessons learned and significant issues or
stumbling blocks that remain in Mongolia's reform process. Finally, Part V offers
some conclusions. For a more in depth analysis to Mongolia's transition, this
article provides various appendices. Appendix A lays the institutional and legal
bases of Mongolia's socialist times. Appendix B delineates the specific reforms
that Mongolia and the donor community implemented.
II. THE THEORY OF RULE OF LAW REFORM

The rule of law is a concept that gained widespread credence and revival
following the dismantling of the former Soviet Union. 14 Prior to September 11,
2001, the United States and other members of the international community began a
massive program of foreign aid (including rule of law programs) to states that were
transitioning to democracy or that were newly democratic, particularly the former
republics of the U.S.S.R. 15 The post-911 environment further intensified the
exportation and implementation of law reforms - mostly under the rubric and with
the final goal of establishing a "rule of law." 16 In the present international relations
environment, there is an increased emphasis on creating and sustaining democratic
states. Western powers in particular believe they can accomplish this through the
exportation of the rule of law to states which lack democracy or market-friendly
institutions or where they are emerging from conflict.1 7 Thus, rule of law
13. This article derives from my experience working at the Supreme Court of Mongolia, and my
many months of research and studies afterward. It owes its completion to a great many people who
guided me during my time in Ulaanbaatar and again back in Washington D.C. I'd like to thank
Ganzorig Gombosuren, who initiated this experience, Chief Judge Ganbat Chimedikham, Munkhbold
Ganbat and their families, who took me in as one of their own, Judge Ts. Tsogt, Judge Enkhbayar and
Munkhzorig for their guidance and explanations, and Eggy, who provided me with warm housing for
my stay in Ulaanbaatar.
14. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule ofLaw Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 110 (1998).
15. Id.
16. See Dan E. Stigall, The Rule of Law: A Primer and a Proposal, 189 MIL. L. REv. 92, 92
(2006).
17. See Id.; Jane Stromseth, Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States Symposium: PostConflict Rule of Law Building: The Needfor a Multi-Layered, SynergisticApproach, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1443, 1443 (2008); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms and the
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promotion becomes an element of foreign policy or an unofficial response to the
rise of the leftists in Latin America, the autocracies in the remaining communist
states, and the dictatorships and sultanates of Africa and the Middle East.18
Additionally, rule of law reform has been an important by-product of
globalization. In fact, the concept of the rule of law in modem times invariably is
tied to the recent phenomenon of globalization of law. Globalization of law is the
"degree to which the whole world lives under a single set of legal rules." 19 It refers
to the trend where "what is sought globally is increased transparency of, and
increased public participation in, bureaucratic decision-making."20
Before the globalization of law, most states did not require a legal system or
legal rules that complemented or interlocked neatly with the global economic rules
in place. In no small part due to increased globalization, states increasingly have
been encouraging their allies and development organizations to assist in their
domestic reform process. 2 1 Normally, their purpose is to leverage the expertise of
their allies and the international community to their specific needs and general
benefit.22
This process is compounded by the fact that, in the last twenty or so years, a
number of regions naturally have undergone catastrophic implosions or drastic
changes.23 Countries in the former Soviet Union, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin
America and parts of Africa all have undertaken recent transformations, mostly
resulting in the creation of democratic institutions, if not democracy itself.24
Complementing these transformations has been a high degree of donor activity,
and of course, what generally follows, rule of law reform.25
However, as frequently and rightly noted, donors have spent billions of
dollars promoting the rule of law without fully understanding or defining the
concept.26 Regardless, the promotion of the rule of law has become a defacto rally
cry for the international development, human-rights and foreign-policy

"Rule of Law ", 101 MICH. L. REv. 2275,2275-77(2003).
18. See, e.g., Carothers, supranote 14, at 97-99; Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, 33
FLETCHERF. WORLD AFF. 49, 50-51 (2009).

19. Martin Shapiro, GlobalizationofLaw, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 37 (1993).
20. Id. at 46 (describing the demise of the technocracy, where the government was the technical
expert in all fields - that gave rise to the new globalization of law, where law is the instrument for
achieving greater transparency and participation in bureaucratic decisions). Given the responses to the
credit crisis that began in 2007, however, the technocracy of national governments is resurgent.
21. See Carothers,supra note 18, at 50-5 1.
22. See id.at 49-51.
23. Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, supra note 14, at 100-101; see Carothers,Rule of Law
Temptations, supranote 18, at 50.
24. See Carothers,supra note 14, at 100-02.
25. In their use of rule-of-law ideals, legal and development scholars, western governments and
multilateral organizations have attacked one another for being imperialistic, ethnocentric, or motivated
by partipris.
26. Brooks, supra note 17, at 2283 (describing the confusion and conflation of those who claim to
promote the rule of law).
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communities. For instance, the mission statement of the international section of
the National Center for State Courts of the United States is "to strengthen the rule
of law and administration of justice throughout the world." 28 To be sure, most aid
donors operate with a common sense understanding the concept of the rule of law,
but their assumptions rarely are grounded in empirical research. 29 Nor is there
consensus on the rule of law's definitive academic conception.
Thus, this section conceives a working rule of law definition for analysis of
post-socialist or transitional legal reforms. The benefit of proceeding from a
developed conception of the rule of law is that its use can be understood easily for
subsequent comparative studies of post-Socialist or other transitional states
undergoing legal and judicial reforms.30
A. What is the Rule ofLaw?
The original meaning of rule of law is simply that persons and institutions
should be accountable to predetermined standards - and that those standards must
apply to everyone equally.31 However, scholars strongly differ over the character
and the elements of the rule of law in modem conceptions.32
This article's formulation represents a refinement of the best procedurallyminimalist definitions of the rule of law. This minimalist approach encompasses
two essential requirements or values: (1) transparency of government decisions and
law-making, which creates a system of rules; and (2) meaningful access to redress
and justice through an independent judiciary or other body.33
27. Id.
28. National Center for State Courts, Mission and History, http://www.ncsc.org/Web Document
Library/AboutUs Mission.aspx (last visited March 4, 2010). The National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) works with the USAID in Mongolia on the Judicial Reform Project. Such an exercise could be
undertaken for many institutes, organizations or government ministries.
29. John Hewko, Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter? 1 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Paper No. 26,
2002), available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/wp26.pdf
30. The alternative would be to proceed with a common sense understanding of the rule of law. In
that case, however, subsequent studies would struggle with an analysis based on uncertain formulations.
31. William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 723, 724 (2000) (explaining the
roots of the term).
32. See e.g., Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31-73 (Thomas Carothers ed., 1996) (discussing

the different conceptions and their implications).
33. See Richard Bilder & Brian Z. Tamanaha, Book Review and Note, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 484
(1995) (reviewing ANTHONY CARTY, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (1992), and SAMMY ADELMAN &
ABDUL PALIWALA, LAW AND CRISIS INTHE THIRD WORLD (1993)) (setting forth two elements: first,
that the government acts pursuant to rules produced in the political arena and respects the civil rights of
its citizens; and second, that there is a judicial party to resort to that embodies the ethic of treating all
before it neutrally and fairly). See also Carothers,supra note 14, at 96 (reaching the same procedurallyminimalist rule of law as Tamanaha albeit with more defining substance. Carothers defines the rule of
law as a system, where laws uphold the political and civil liberties pursuant to universal human rights
recognitions, which are clear in meaning and apply equally to everyone. Further, he calls for the central
institutions of the legal system to be fair, competent, and efficient, and for an accused to have the right
to a fair, prompt trial with a presumption of innocence. Finally, governance must be integrated into the
legal framework and officials must be subject to and accepting of the law); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The
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Additionally, there are primary qualities that support the two essential
requirements. These bedrock concepts advancing the minimalist definition are:
procedural fairness in the passage of fair, equal and nondiscriminatory laws and
decisions with the effect of law; and procedural fairness in access to the courts or
other body for meaningful, fair, impartial and equal redress and justice. 34
Apart from the bedrock concepts, there is a penumbra of other secondary or
supporting qualities. 35 For the most part, academics conceive of elements that
primarily support the procedural quality of rule of law.36 Importantly, the rule of
law is a system of rules - rules should govern certain relationships and events.
Thus, the rule of law: must theoretically and actually guide people through legal
rules, standards and principles; must be reasonably stable; must be supreme; and
must utilize impartial justice through courts or other bodies with fair procedures.37
Further, supporting the condition of transparency is the principle that people
should know what the government's decisions are - they must be pre-announced,
preexisting (no retroactive laws) and made publicly available. 38 Additionally,
meaningful access to justice requires the practical availability of process to judge
the government's action with the law.3 9 Institutionally, actors must have regular
availability of tribunals, agencies or courts to resolve disputes, which have
impartial judges, and whose decisions are promptly and effectively implemented.40
The agency that judges the government's actions must be independent from the
actor being evaluated. 4 1 Accessibility, usually found through the courts, should be
supported by an active and independent bar association. A series of strictly
procedural standards sustain these principles: "adequate record-keeping, fair trial
practices, the publicity of proceedings, seasoned explanations of results, and the
right of appeal."42

Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1997) (explaining
that definitions of the rule of law generally consist of three values: protection against anarchy; the
creation of conditions where people have confidence in their knowledge of the legal consequences of
their actions; and protection against official arbitrariness); David Kairys, Searchingfor the Rule ofLaw,
36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 307, 318 (2003) (listing "three essential requirements for the rule of law: certain
relationships, events and transactions should be subject to rules; the rules laid down should be followed
and should apply to everyone, including limits on the government and on the powerful; and the rules
should be enforced with some mechanism for seeking redress").
34. See Kairys, supra note 33, at 312-14.
35. Id. at 311-14 (collecting and detailing the fourteen most oft-listed conceptions of the rule of
law, which includes some substantive elements and some western beliefs, such as the need for judicial
decision-making and judicial review).
36. See, e.g., id. at 312-14; Brooks, supra note 17, at 2284 n.43.
37. Brooks, supranote 17, at 2284 n.43 (contrasting other authors' conceptions of the rule of law).
38. Whitford, supra note 31, at 725-26 (discussing how laws must be made ex ante, or before they
are applied).
39. Id. at 726 (noting that this is a practical condition - an aggrieved person or someone on their
behalf must be able to complain).
40. John V. Orth, Exporting the Rule ofLaw, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 71, 79 (1998).
41. Whitford, supra note 31, at 726 (explaining that independence means freedom from fear).
42. Orth, supra note 40, at 79 (discussing the "policy framework" of the rule of law).
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The benefit of a minimalist, procedurally-oriented conception of the rule of
law is that it moderates charges of ethnocentrism or cultural imperialism.43 In
particular, any substantive conception inherently brings into a definition the values
and ideals of the culture or professional and personal background of the definer. A
minimalist definition also defends against the criticism that a substantive
conception leads to transplantation of large bodies of law that may not suit the host
environment, and certainly does not suit every host environment.44
The value of such a minimalist, procedural rule of law is generally
recognized, but not frequently applied.45 Practitioners frequently jump directly
into a substantive conception of the rule of law. Importantly, such a practice skips
the creation of a foundation for a substantive conception. Overall, the rule of law
is grounded firmly in procedural fairness - categorically referred to as justice.
Anything above that would be a substantive or normative addition to the
procedural foundation of the rule of law.46 The lesson here is that any normatively
coherent or defensible substantive conception of a just legal system should be
predicated on the pre-existence of a procedurally-just conception of the rule of
law.47 As such, any substantive conceptions above this basic structure are
appropriate only after the minimalist, procedurally-oriented rule of law has been
established.
Writers and scholars have advanced the notion of the rule of law from
imperialism onwards and imperialist states transplanted their legal codes onto their
subjects pursuant to this notion.48 So why has the world once again turned to
expounding the benefits of and exporting the rule of law?

43. Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The PoliticalEconomy of Rule of Law Reform in
Developing Countries,26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 99, 105 (2004).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Brooks, supranote 17, at 2283-84.
46. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 107.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality and the TransplantEffect,
47 EuR. ECON. REv. 165, 165 (2003) (analyzing the determinants of effective legal institutions in fortynine countries).
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THE RULE OF LAW - MINIMALIST APPROACH4 9

2 Essential Values
Transparency of government decisions and lawmaking, which creates a system of
rules,
AND
Meaningful access to redress and justice through an independent judiciary or other
body.
PRIMARY

QUALITIES

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN:

Passage of fair, equal and nondiscriminatory
laws and
decisions with the effect of law,
AND
Access to the judiciary or other body for meaningful, fair, impartial and equal
redress and
justice.

SECONDARY

QUALITIES

System of Rules that
Govern relationships and events,
Actually guide people,
Are reasonably stable, AND
Are supreme.

Transparency
Principles
Government Decisions, that
Are preannounced,
Are preexisting, AND
Are publicly available.

in

Meaningful Access to Justice Principles:
Practical availability of process,
Active and independent bar,
Regular availability of tribunals, agencies or
courts to resolve disputes,
Impartial judges, AND
Prompt and effective implementation of
decisions.

Procedural Standards:
Adequate record-keeping,
Fair trial practices,
Publicity of proceedings,
Seasoned explanations of results,
AND
The right of appeal.

49. This is the author's conception of a minimalist, procedurally-oriented conception of the rule of
law, distilled from the best academic formulations as discussed above.
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B. What is the Role ofRule ofLaw Reform?
Western legal theorists believe that rule of law reform will allow states to
transition from "the first stage of political and economic reform to consolidate both
democracy and market economics."50 The "rule of law revival" occurred with the
political openings of different regions - Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, parts
of the Middle East, and parts of Asia.51 The escalation of rule of law reform
appears to have grown principally with the fall of the ex-Soviet satellites, whose
transitions to market economies and democracy (or some vestige of it) spurred a
newfound interest in the role of the rule of law in the development of the twin
towers of political and economic reform.52
Because of the total or near absolute dismantling of the economies and social
institutions of the ex-Soviet states, they immediately needed large amounts of
donor aid, primarily in the form of money and technical advisors.53 Legal
advisors, motivated partly by altruism and partly by self-interest, literally poured
into the former U.S.S.R. from donor states, bilateral aid agencies, multilateral
development banks, and nongovernmental aid organizations.54
Some legal
advisors came from government agencies to assist in the development of their new
systems. Others were sent by multilateral donor agencies as strings attached to
much needed large-scale financial aid. 5 Of course, legal and development
theorists followed their lead in devising new formulations of the proper scope and
strategy of legal reform.56 In any case, the rhetoric of rule of law was used as a
catch-all phrase to embody or consolidate democracy, achieve economic growth
and expand social progress.
1. Democratic Reform
Democracy is the (broadly speaking) principle of "popular control over public
decision making and decision makers; and equality between citizens in the exercise
of that control."57 The institutional means of accomplishing the basic democratic

50. Carothers, supra note 14, at 97. But see Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law
Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge 6 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 34,
2003) (explaining how the proposition that rule of law is necessary for economic development and
democracy is not as axiomatic as first appears).
51. Carothers, supranote 14, at 97-98.
52. Id. at 95.
53. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, PoliticalReform in Mongolia: Between Russia and China, 35 AsIAN
SURV. 459, 459-60 (1995).
54. Carothers, supranote 14, at 103.
55. Id. at 103-04.
56. See, e.g., Orth, supranote 40, at 71; Whitford, supranote 31, at 723; Kairys, supranote 33, at
307-08; Brooks, supranote 17, at 2276-79.
57. Int'l Inst. for Democracy & Electoral Assistance [IDEA], Democracy Assessment: The Basics
of the InternationalIDEA Assessment Framework, at 3 (2002), available at http://www.idea.int/
publications/sod/upload/demo ass inlayengL.pdf (providing a methodology for citizens of any
democracy in the world to assess the functioning of their own democratic systems. The Government of
Mongolia invited representatives from all over the country, officials, civil society and private sector on
June 30 - July 1, 2005, to discuss a Draft National Plan of Action to Consolidate Democracy in
Mongolia. The focus of this plan is a national research project conducted according to the Democracy
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principle are realized through legal institutions. 58 Rule of law reform is
intrinsically attached to democratic ideals, if not to democracy itself. Democratic
institutions are protected by law and necessarily dependent on the rule of law.59
States that have backslid - or are struggling with weak rule of law reform - are
generally those that are becoming authoritarian or disrespectful of their
constitutional underpinnings and thus, undemocratic. 60
Additionally, the
globalization of the humanitarian regime and human rights law has influenced the
definition of a rule of law. The consecration and protection of individual rights is a
core tenet of democracy, and has become intertwined irreducibly from the rule of
law ideal.61 Overall, there is a substantial grey area between democracy and the
rule of law. Nonetheless, undertaking rule of law reforms invariably strengthens
and consecrates already-established democratic institutions.
Mongolian citizens understood that they had joined the worldwide democratic
movement. The government of Mongolia's denouncement of the communist state
62
and its subsequent successful elections with full suffrage signaled so much. To a
great extent, the impetus for change took place in Ulaanbaatar, in the universities
and with the young, moderate leaders. 63 Although the state began a democratic
transition, the countryside itself still was mired in its communist recent past, and
most, if not all of the population still was attached to Mongolia's socialist
institutions. 64 In Mongolia, the attainment of procedurally-minimalist rule of law
65
would encourage and assist the success of their democratic transition.
2. Economic Reform
It is "regarded as a truism that the 'rule of law' is causally related to economic
development." 66 At the very least, legal reforms of post-Leninist or postAssessment methodology).
58. Id. at 3-4 (describing the values that create democratic legal institutions; examples of
democratic legal institutions include civil and political rights systems, economic and social rights,
electoral and party systems, NGO rights, anti-discrimination laws, effective and appropriate avenues to
legal redress, and an appropriate domestic and international human rights framework).
59. See United States Agency International Development [USAID], Rule of Law Program,
http://www.usaid.gov/our work/democracyand governance/technical areas/rule of law/ (last visited
Feb. 11, 2010) ("The rule of law is the cornerstone for all other elements of democracy. A free and fair
political system, protection of human rights, a vibrant civil society, public confidence in the police and
the courts and economic development all depend upon accountable governments, fair and accessible
application of the law and respect for international human rights standards. In post-conflict settings,
reestablishing the rule of law is the first step in the rebuilding process. Establishing peace and security
and rebuilding justice institutions can help to develop the necessary climate for reconciliation, public
confidence and subsequent economic growth.")
60. Carothers, supranote 14, at 98 (describing regional experiences with rule-of-law reforms).
61. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 1-2

(2004).
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
between
negative

See, e.g., Ginsburg,supra note 53, at 463; Bilskie & Arnold, supranote 5, at 205.
Ginsburg, supranote 53, at 462-63.
Id. at 463-64.
See Bilskie & Arnold, supranote 5.
Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 102 (referring to evidence of a negative correlation
individuals' perceptions of judicial unpredictability and growth and investment; evidence of a
correlation between corruption and investment; and evidence of positive correlation between
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authoritarian societies are necessary to establish a fair, functioning market
economy. 67 In other developing or transitional countries, extensive legal reforms
are undertaken to establish more market-friendly legal systems, rather than to
create a market economy from scratch.68
The rule of law is essential because it provides the necessary elements to a
market system, including: "universal rules uniformly applied, which generates
predictability and allows planning; a regime of contract law that secures future
expectations; and property law to protect the fruits of labor." 69 With the largescale promotion of rule of law by the international aid community, the
conventional understanding is that a fair, transparent, stable and accountable legal
and judicial system is necessary to attract foreign direct investment, itself a crucial
factor in economic growth and development in transitional and developing states. 70
The pressure to create this framework comes not just from institutional advisors
and requirements within the aid packages, but from the organic demands that
economic globalization puts on governments to accommodate or lose out.7 1
In Mongolia, economic collapse was the primary influence on the minds of
the population. Resultantly, to achieve the long-term goals of a market economy
and a political democracy, Mongolia's leaders realized that its initial reforms must
achieve, in the short term, economic stability and a fundamental change in the
psychology of its citizens. 72 The procedurally-minimalist rule of law would
achieve these necessary economic reforms.
It is important to note that the economic agenda of the rule of law also
achieves democratic benefits. For instance, the rule of law protects the functioning
of major economic institutions and guards businesses and individuals from
discriminatory, inefficient or illegal actions of government in the economy.
Indeed, as there are substantial political, economic and social benefits from rule of
law reforms, a more appropriate view is that the rule of law achieves integrated
benefits.

de facto independence of a state's highest court and economic growth).
67. See Hewko, supranote 29, at 3.
68. Id.
69. Bilder & Tamanaha, supranote 33, at 473. See also id. at 484 (arguing that beyond protecting
economic development and the liberal-democratic framework, law is of secondary status, where
lawyers are "technicians who effectuate decisions made by others").
70. See Hewko, supra note 29, at 3. Of course, when accounting for the realities of economic
globalization - there is an increased need for a country to create the legal and judicial framework to
take advantage of the free flow of goods, labor and capital. Without this framework in place and
protected, risk-averse investors will refuse to invest.
71. Governments that do not accommodate globalization through liberal foreign investment laws,
accession to the WTO and its obligations, etc., invariably lose the benefits of globalization like
increased trade and investment.
72. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 459; Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 205; Goyal, supra
note 10, at 633.
73. Carothers, supranote 14, at 97.

472

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:3

3. Integrated View of Reform
The rule of law fulfills more than the creation of a democratic or economic
framework. Development should be seen in a comparative integrated view, and
legal development should not be analyzed in isolation nor only connected to
economic development. Amartya Sen argues that there is a need for conceptual
integrity in the development of a successful legal and judicial system, one that
views legal development not merely by its achievements through the passage of
laws and their successful exercise, but through the enhancement of personal
capabilities - "[the] freedom - to exercise the rights and entitlements that we
associate with legal progress."74 In this integrated view, the development of a
successful legal and judicial system has a peripheral effect on all aspects of
development, and should be valued and judged by its peripheral as well as its
intrinsic effects. 75
Legal reforms of stable states generally have a specific focus, such as
76
amendment to the constitution or the modernization of the criminal code. In a
post-socialist environment like that of Mongolia, the government tables every
aspect of society for reform. After completing its constitution, Mongolia engaged
its political, economic and social spheres in a comprehensive reformation, to
achieve its goals of a political democracy and a market economy. 77
Transformation to a market economy and a capitalist system results in winners and
losers, and resultant social inequities occur. Particularly because socialism ensured
that most (if not all) Mongolians had basic necessities, for legal reforms to be
successful, any arising social concerns in a transition must also be countered.
The goal of rule of law initially must be the achievement of the minimalist
requirements. However, the rule of law reform should be valued by its
fundamental effects arising from its definition, as well as its peripheral effects primarily social progress. Having discussed both the elements of a procedurallyminimalist rule of law and the judgment methodology, the actual consummation of
the rule of law reform program is the critical problem for post-Socialist or
transitional states.
C How Do We Achieve the Rule ofLaw?
Simply conceptualized, to achieve the rule of law, a state must undergo
judicial and legal reforms with the intent of realizing its minimalist requirements. 79
74. Amartya Sen, Keynote Address, World Bank Conference- Comprehensive Legal and Judicial
Development: What is the Role of Legal and Judicial Reform in the Development Process? (June 5,
2000), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/legaland judicial
.pdf (explaining that legal development, like economic or political development, is a constitutive part of
development as a whole, which resembles a "thickly interwoven textile").
75. Id.
76. Carothers, supranote 14, at 99-100.
77. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 459; Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 205; Goyal, supra
note 10, at 633.
78. See, e.g., Sen, supranote 74.
79. See, e.g., Orth, supranote 40, at 71; Whitford, supra note 31, at 725; Kairys, supra note 33, at
307; Brooks, supranote 17, at 2275.
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For post-autocratic states, the central task is to introduce the over-arching concept
of accountability that "requires public officials to obey laws and their own rules
and calls them to account when they do not."8 0 To achieve this, the reforms have
to be sanctioned and supported from above - from those who categorically lead the
state, politically and economically.
Ultimately, rule of law reform is (at least
partly) a political enterprise aimed at constraining public authority. The danger
inherent in holding accountable public authority is that those who wield public
power generally will resist any reforms which deny them the benefits of their
authority.82 Consequently, reforms have to combat or temper such resistance at the
outset. In addition to being a political exercise, achieving a rule of law is a
process-oriented development.
1. Rule of Law Realization Theories
Rule-Based Economic Realization: Richard Posner advocates a strict rule-based
reform, whereby existing institutions, however inefficient themselves, will
administer newly created, efficient rules. 83 The benefit lies in the small fixed costs
of creating and instituting a rule, as compared with the very costly and timeconsuming reforms of legal institutions.84 Thus, legal reform can stimulate
economic growth through rule reforms, at a smaller expense. Increased economic
growth will in turn add stability to the nation, increasing its human and economic
resources, and creating a framework for more ambitious legal reforms in the longer
U.85
8
run.

Posner seems to advocate a more ambitious rule-based reform at the expense
of legal institutional strengthening - particularly of the judiciary.86 However,
Posner's rule-based reform agenda leans heavily on a substantive conception of the
rule of law, thus it encounters the difficulties of transplantation and cultural
imperialism. If the rules are not appropriate for the host country or enforceable,
then all is practically for naught, at the expense of possible institutional
strengthening.8 8 Especially in the face of a poor-track record of rule of law reform
over the past two decades, it appears rather more propitious to hedge the risk of
failure through active reforms of multiple sectors. Because of these criticisms, the
realization theory that this article promotes does not include this formulation.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Shapiro, supranote 19, at 57.
See Carothers,supra note 14, at 96.
Id.
Richard Posner, Creating a Legal Frameworkfor Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK

RES. OBSERVER 1, 4-5 (1998).

84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id. at 5-7.
87. Id. at 6.
88. But cf Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 101-09 (criticizing the typical conception of
viewing institutional strengthening as a necessity to attract FDI, and arguing for legal reform to
emphasize the details and not general concepts; e.g., specific, even mundane changes that are necessary
for "existing legislation to function within the cultural, political, and economic realities of the host
countries"). This argument seems to defend against charges of cultural imperialism while advocating a
rule-based reform agenda.
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Rule-Based Formalistic Realization: Carothers forcefully argues that the
concentration of donors and reforming states should be on the depth of the reforms,
in three categories: type-one reform concentrates on the laws themselves; type-two
reform strengthens the law-related institutions to make them more competent,
efficient, and accountable; and type-three reform has a deeper goal of enforcing
government's compliance with law. 89 This reformation agenda is rule-driven as
well, concentrating on technical and institutional reforms that primarily affect the
formalistic legal system.
Norm-Creation Realization: There is little evidence that formalistic reforms or
institutional strengthening is effective without a culture of support for the rule of
law. 90 Another and perhaps more cogent methodology of rule of law reform
operates from a general rule of law theory to specific applications. First, there are
norms of universal application, usually stated in great generality - in particular the
notion of fairness which underlies transparency, accountability and inclusionwhich must permeate the bureaucratic decision-makers and the legal culture. 91
Second, there are specifically-tailored reforms that achieve particular, defined
goals while continuing to uphold the norms of universal application. 92 Aptly, this
type of reform focuses on norm creation. Institutional strengthening, while
certainly necessary, is neither a condition precedent nor a by-product of norm
creation.
Particular rules should be reformed or created only to meet particular societal
challenges or shortcomings in the existing framework. 93 In this formulation, the
rule of law is a culture, and the stimulation and creation of that culture is the overarching goal within which the state undertakes the judicial and legal reforms.94

Integrated Realization: However, these models are not in a zero-sum game. A
more appropriate methodology for realizing the procedurally-minimalist rule of
law combines formalistic reform theory with the norm creation theory.95 If the
umbrella paradigm of norm creation is indeed the universal and ubiquitous concept
that it seems, institutional strengthening and formalistic reforms will help expand
and support it. 96 In this view, norm creation is the umbrella paradigm overseeing

89. Carothers, supra note 14, at 99-100 (discussing rule of law reforms by focusing on the depth
of reforms).
90. See Brooks, supra note 17, at 2284-85 (positing that Thomas Carothers' "Rule of Law
Assistance Standard Menu" is an untenable model and arguing that rule-of-law reform is fundamentally
an issue of norm creation); Stromseth, supranote 17, at 1443-44.
91. Brooks, supra note 17, at 2285 (criticizing the formalistic rule of law conception: "[t]he rule
of law is not something that exists "beyond culture" and that can be somehow added to an existing
culture by the simple expedient of creating formal structures and rewriting constitutions and statutes").
92. Id.
93. Thus, specific rule-creation controls the typical problem of adequate or well-formulated laws
with inefficient enforcement mechanisms which undermines the rule of law by lowering individual or
investor confidence in the sanctity of the legal system.
94. See Brooks, supranote 17, at 2285.
95. This is the authors' conception distilled from the best academic formulations as discussed
supra.
96. See also Bilder & Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 484 (urging the importance of the development
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the long and difficult process of creating efficient legal institutions, which requires
heavy doses of capital and expensive, educated labor.97
Of course, the criticism of the rule-based and formalistic conceptions is that
they work at the expense of concentrating on norm creations, since the rewriting of
laws and upgrading of the courts does not cause judges, ministers and
parliamentarians to "absorb" the doctrines underlying the rule of law. 98
In an integrated view, the focus is on norm creation, but the typical
formalistic reforms are both suitable and needed to establish an appropriate legal
culture. The actual reforms should follow the integration and development of the
intellectual norms - not only the training in market economics and democratic
institutions - but also a thorough understanding of governmental and judicial
accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and accessibility. To put it another
way, the focus should be on the creation of a rule of law culture while
accomplishing necessary institutional and particular reforms.
2. The Path of Realization
The reform of legislation is a natural starting point in transforming a society
from socialist legal traditions and a centrally-planned economy to a market
economy. In Mongolia, before legal reforms could occur, Mongolia's leaders had
to meet the preconditions to reform discussed above, which culminated with the
establishment of a multi-party system and the adoption of a new Constitution. 99
The difficulty then lay in conveying the provisions of this modem Constitution to a
restructured economic, political and legal system that could implement and enforce
these new rights. 00
Many donor organizations and academics utilize a version of the following
chronology for the undertaking of rule of law reforms.101
Stage One: Rewrite the constitution, laws (including modernizing the civil
and criminal code) and regulations.
Stage Two: Undertake judicial reforms through: creating an independent
judiciary; professionalizing the bar and the bench; increasing judicial efficiency;
increasing judicial accessibility; increasing the competence and professional
standards of the judiciary through a reformed law school curriculum, support for
bar associations, and judicial training; and establishing alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms.

of the body of legal doctrine in addition to the basics of institution building).
97. See, e.g., Brooks, supranote 17, at 2275.
98. Id.
99. See also, B. Chimid, Advisor to Parliament, Speech at Conference in Celebration of Tenth
Anniversary of Asian Foundation's Mongolian Program, (Sep. 11, 2000), in THE ASIA FOUNDATION,
MONGOLIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES,

18-22

(2000).
100. See, e.g., Ginsburg,supra note 2, at 459; Bilskie & Arnold, supranote 5, at 205.
101. In addition to this chronology, and what is not focused on by donors, the rule-of-law definition
and realization theory proposed by this article require overarching emphasis on norm creation.
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Stage Three: Encourage legislative and executive reform through good
governance programs.
Stage Four: Increase legal representation and accessibility through legal aid
programs and nongovernmental organizations.
Stage Five: Embark on other institutional reforms such as police, prosecutor,

and prison reforms. 102
Additionally there are other factors, not perfectly congruent with the universal
notions embodied in rule of law, but tangential and supportive. First, an
independent, active media can do much to push for transparency of government
decisions and advance meaningful participation in the decision-making. 103 At the
least, an independent media can create a meaningful dialogue that can lead to
increased participation in governance. An active media can make public
criticisms, raise awareness levels, be a voice to the poor and vulnerable, and most
importantly, force the government to be accountable, transparent and inclusive. 104
Of course, the right of free speech must be judicially protected for this outlet to
carry its weight. Second, public interest in social responsibility can create social
challenge and change, thus stimulating a rule of law culture.1 05 Further, sensitivity
to the actual social environment is an important aspect in these legal reforms.
3. The Problem of Constraining the Leaders
Owing to the limited successes by rule of law reforms over the last two
decades, it is commonly accepted that "rule of law reform will succeed only if it
gets at the fundamental problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled by the law." 1 06
Emphasis on a notion-based rule of law aims to achieve precisely this - to reduce

and eventually eliminate unreceptive leaders and officials.1 0 7 To be sure, these
individuals will only surrender their "traditional impunity" under great
pressures.10 8 More often than not, domestic pressure alone will not suffice in
achieving this surrender, thus there is a clear role for foreign sources. 109 The
underlying assumption, as discussed above, is that rule of law reform is a political
endeavor and not a technical or bureaucratic enterprise, so its success is subject to
inherent and internal political uncertainties. 10 Changing the mindset of leaders is
102. See, e.g., Orth, supranote 40, at 77; Whitford, supranote 31, at 725; Kairys, supranote 33, at
312-14; Brooks, supranote 17, at 2284-85; Carothers, supranote 14, at 99-100.
103. See Sen, supranote 74, at 19 (arguing that a vigorous media can strengthen economic security,
political liberties, legal and human rights, etc., but judicial guarantees must protect the right of fair
speech, fair comment and public criticism).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Carothers, supranote 14, at 96.
107. See id. at 100.
108. Id. at 96 (describing the primary obstacles to achieving the rule of law).
109. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 128-34 (arguing that because of the importance of
historical, cultural and social impediments, rule-of-law reforms need effective monitoring and
assessment by a credible, and likely multilateral, institution). One need only look at the example of
Mobutu in Zaire / Democratic Republic of the Congo to see what could occur when foreign donors do
not exert pressure on leaders to surrender their impunity.
110. See id.
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necessarily a political exercise, where the actors will weigh the benefits, costs, and
realities of ceding to the rule of law. Consequently, this formulation leads
credence to the general understanding that the success of reforms relies not on
technical or financial support, but on combating political and human obstacles.111
4. The Use of Pre-Conditions for Constraining the Leaders
Leaders and non-receptive officials can be constrained through a combination
of domestic and foreign influence. Domestic interest groups play an important role
in exerting bottom-up pressures.
Nongovernmental organizations, domestic
investors, minorities, and entrepreneurs should agitate for suitable changes and
form broad coalitions with the populace and government officials. The goal is to
stimulate change horizontally and ultimately vertically using a broad section of
alliances, rather than fractured interest groups clamoring for specific favors and
changes, what usually supports or results in corruptive political exchanges.
To augment domestic efforts, there is a clear role for international pressure.
Foreign governments, multilateral banks, bilateral organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, and foreign citizens should exert top-down pressures on the leaders
of host countries through conditionality, to push for specific and traceable rule of
law reforms. Of course, by no means does this formulation intend for loans and
grants to be conditioned on the creation of a rule of law program. The host
country should conceive of and establish a rule of law program on its own, lest the
reforms be reduced to mere formalities. Only after a consensus of high-level
support is in place will international pressure serve any purposes. In the absence
of upper-level sponsorship, or at least acceptance, rule of law reforms will be
diametrically opposed by those whose power, influence, or economics will be
affected. 112
When domestic support for a rule of law program is lacking, legal advisors
should forgo imposing or conditioning donations on legal and judicial reform, and
focus on encouraging a grass roots movement for reform, through discourse with
the host country's bar associations, nongovernmental associations and government
officials. 113 However, where a rule of law program is in place, foreign
organizations and groups should exert influence to set in motion a rule of law
culture. 114
Use of condition precedents is a potentially successful method for foreign
donors and states to achieve the rule of law.115 To illustrate, consider the area of
nongovernmental organizations. Where restructuring is taking place, and some
elites do not want a comprehensive nongovernmental organization law for fear of

111. Carothers, supra note 14, at 96 (explaining the human obstacle as the central difficulty in the
establishing the rule of law); see also Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 119 (creating a five-part
strategy to address the political barriers to rule-of-law reform).
112. Carothers, supranote 14, at 96; Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 119.
113. Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14
THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 117, 123-28 (1999).

114. See id. at 124-25.
115. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 132.
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losing political control, serious pressure should be placed on those elites to cede
their opposition through conditions precedents. 116 Condition precedents can be
desirable benefits from industrialized countries, the international aid community,
accession to regional trade blocs, bilateral trade deals, or accession to the WTO.
These pressures should be used to disrupt opposition only to the reforms which are
necessary to create the rule of law culture and framework - in this case, the legal
basis for nongovernmental organizations to operate domestically.
Even though the underlying doctrine will surely not be the influential factor in
an actor ceding opposition, there are fringe benefits that actually support the
creation of a rule of law culture. Younger generations will have a needed reform
in place (the inclusion of nongovernmental organizations in the dialogue of
society), thus increasing transparency, participation and redress in the future. 117 At
least in this way, the notion of inclusive governmental rule will be experienced by
the individuals who publicly participate in society and those in government who
are receptive to such ideas. Resultantly, the rule of law culture increasingly
develops, deepens and strengthens.118
D. The Role of the Judiciaryin Implementing the Rule ofLaw
"The Rule of Law depends on judges willing to decide cases in
accordance with principle, despite occasionally incurring official
displeasure,and sometimes at realpersonalrisk" 119

While the rule of law necessitates the constraint of leaders, it depends on the
judiciary. A close study of the rule of law chart demonstrates that the judiciary is
the focus of most of the rule of law reforms. 120 By and large, judicial reforms play
a determinative role in the establishment of a rule of law culture.
An underlying goal of judicial reforms is to achieve government compliance
with the law and create acceptance of the rule of law values at the top echelon of
government. 12 1 This is possible through the integrated combination of institutional
reforms and the creation of norms. 122 Institutional judicial reforms are capital and
labor intensive, and demand sophistication and patience.
An impartial
administration of the rule of law is only accessible through the creation of a strong

116. Id. at 129-33.
117. See Carothers,supra note 14, at 100.
118. It appears that many Central Asian post-Leninist states that embraced rule-of-law reform
during their transitions and that have backslid into increasing authoritarianism, would have benefited by
a more strict and principled focus on rule-of-law doctrine and the creation of a notion-based legal
culture. This study is formulated precisely for such purpose - to create a theoretical framework to
compare the experiences of post-socialist states. Here, the author focuses on Mongolia, probably the
least written about ex-Soviet "satellite."
119. Orth, supranote 40, at 81.
120. This assessment is pursuant to the author's formulation for the rule-of law chart. Other ruleof-law formulations do not necessarily focus on the judiciary though it is hard to conceive a formulation
that does not impact the judiciary.
121. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 110-11.
122. See Brooks, supranote 17, at 2283-87.
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legal culture that supports the rule of law notions. 123 The following factors
constitute the principal judicial reforms that a country can undertake and that assist
in the establishment of a procedurally-minimalist rule of law.
Judicial Independence: Principally, achieving judicial independence is a key
reform that ensures a strong apolitical judiciary, which is free to mete out
justice. 124 Judicial independence is one of the essential values to the above
formulation of a procedurally-minimalist rule of law. The constitution or other
legislation usually assures judicial independence. Above all, a strong and
independent judiciary embodied with the ethos of rule of law will have the
freedom and strength to challenge governmental actions that hinder the rule of law.
Thus, a high level of support is necessary from the ministry of justice, judges and
judicial employees, in addition to the legislature and senior executive branch
officials, for judicial reform to succeed. 125 Judicial independence reforms in
societies which previously lacked it depends on executive and legislative actors
126
willing to allow an independent judiciary.
This usually occurs through the
provision of a sufficient budget, compliance with judicial decisions and support for
institutional strengthening. 127
Judicial Council: The creation and implementation of a judicial council supports
an independent judiciary. 128 This reform is of particular importance in postSocialist societies that historically have not had an independent judiciary. 129 The
institution of a judicial council assists judicial independence, since a cross-section
of government screens judicial appointments, monitors the judiciary, institutes
disciplinary proceedings and sets the budget.130 The procedures for selection of
judges must be refined to limit improper influence and achieve genuine judicial
independence. If judges and judicial employees are sufficiently secure in their
tenure, and have a sufficiently high salary, they will be more independent,
competent, and honest. 13 1
Judicial Efficiency: Increasing judicial efficiency embraces the notion of fairness,
which underlies the rule of law culture. Technical and material aid increases the
resources and capabilities of courts, by disseminating computers, copiers and fax
machines; streamlining court processing times; and creating a framework for
public access to printed judicial decisions.132 These reforms are fundamentally
123. Id.
124. Danielle Conway-Jones, Mongolia, Law Convergence, and the Third Era of Globalization,3
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 63, 71 (2004) (expressing that the flexibility inherent in the
Mongolian Constitution under Article 49, judicial independence, is a hallmark of common law
traditions). Indeed, judicial independence is grounded in the ideal of fairness.
125. See Messick, supra note 113, at 117-36 (summarizing a six case study of USAID judicial
reform projects and holding so).
126. See Messick, supranote 113, at 124; Thomas Carothers, supranote 14, at 96.
127. See Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 120-21.
128. Id. at 120.
129. See id. at 120-21.
130. Id. at 120.
131. See id.at 120-21.
132. But see Messick, supra note 113, at 124-25 (explaining that the authors of the six case study
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important as they increase judicial efficiency. "Protracted case processing times
and overburdened administrative staff may lead to resource-privileged individuals
dominating the court's time to the detriment of those who have fewer resources
with which to exert influence."1 33 Reforming judicial procedures also can increase
efficiency by eliminating duplicative or contradictory procedures. 134 Overall,
judicial efficiency reduces possibilities for corruption, increases accessibility to the
courts, and ensures that decisions are consistent throughout the country.135
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Mechanisms and the Informal Society:
Improving access to justice through new procedures and the creation of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms increases individuals' ability to achieve meaningful
redress - and hold government and other individuals responsible for their
actions.136 In many countries, informal dispute mechanisms must be studied and
brought into the formal legal environment, so that extra-judicial remedies are
limited in size and context, thus entrenching the rule of law firmly in the
judiciary.137 Of course, these informal mechanisms can be kept in local or
neighborhood governments or councils, but reforms at the least should create the
ability to appeal decisions to a judicial body.
Professionalizing the Judiciary: Professionalizing the judicial system is an
important reform for creating a fair and impartial judiciary.138
Raising
accreditation standards, reforming legal education, creating ethics standards and
monitoring committees, increasing the status of bar associations and raising the
status of the judge in society will contribute to both an increased professionalism
within the judiciary and an increased public perception of the profession. 13 9
Leizal Education: Reforming and modernizing the curriculum of the legal
education creates a new awareness of modem legal norms, issues, and the nuances
of a market economy, and encourages a more sophisticated rule of law culture.140
As well, reformation of legal education ensures that all law schools offer
coursework that meets predetermined standards. There is a need to coordinate the
legal education so that law schools teach substantially the same subject matter, to
reduce discrepancies in knowledge and in the practice of law once the students
become accredited lawyers. The creation of a required bar examination will ensure
that these minimum standards are met by all legal graduates.

found that these types of reforms have little impact where there is a lack of a consensus for judicial
reform).
133. See Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 111.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. USAID, OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PRACTITIONERS GUIDE 1 (1988), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracyand

governance/publications/pdfs/pnacp335.pdf
137. See id.at 28, 49.
138. See Carothers,supra note 14, at 100.
139. See id.; OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, supra note 136, at 35.
140. Daniels & Trebilcock, supra note 43, at 117-18.
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Bar Associations: Bar associations regulate the legal profession, and create and
administer the standards for accreditation and professional licensing. 141 Increasing
their scope and role as an oversight committee will generate an infrastructure of
accountability and professionalism. Bar associations also provide Continuing
Legal Education (CLE) programs, which help to educate the judiciary in how to
understand, implement and judge newly-passed legislation and ensure that
accredited attorneys continue to meet minimum knowledge and training
requirements.142 Perhaps most importantly, CLE programs can emphasize rule of
law notions, and over time these can influence acceptance for the rule of law.
Accountability: Since rule of law reform is in part a political activity, proper
performance is dependent on political actors deciding to comply or being forced to
comply with the law. Thus, accountability of officials is predicated on the
psychological willingness of the individual judge to rule honestly and
professionally. 14 But it would be folly to predicate the establishment of the rule of
law wholly on the judiciary, since ultimately high-level officials must accept living
subject to the law. As such, weak judicial commitment to rule of law reform will
undermine the efficacy of the whole premise.144
Overall, the judiciary is fundamentally important for achieving a procedurally
minimalist rule of law. The judiciary is prevalent in the rule of law's essential
values (meaningful access to redress and justice through an independent judiciary),
in its primary qualities (access to the courts or other bodies for meaningful, fair,
impartial and equal redress and justice), and overwhelmingly so in its secondary
qualities (procedural standards and meaningful access to justice principles). 145
"Rewriting constitutions, laws, and regulations is the easy part. Far-reaching
institutional reform, also necessary, is arduous and slow." 146 The accumulation of
the appropriate legal doctrine and professional norms and institutional "upgrading"
takes time, and necessarily, donor organizations must be patient and supportive of
the whole process of legal assistance, and host states must be committed to the full
stage and scope of reforms.
III. MONGOLIA'S TRANSITIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

147

The reformists agitating a transformation to democracy advocated four main
policy changes: a multiparty system and free and fair elections - i.e. inclusion in
the government; a free-market economy; democracy; and the end of bureaucratic

141. Id. at 115-16 (describing several functions of a bar association in the legal system of a
nation).
142. Id. at 116.
143. Orth, supra note 40, at 81.
144. See Carothers, supra note 14, at 100-03 (painting a global picture of rule-of-law reform by
making continental and regional observations, and opining that the movement toward rule of law is
broad but shallow); Carothers, supra note 18, at 50 (noting that over the last 10 years, political leaders
worldwide have asserted a commitment to building the rule of law).
145. See supratext accompanying note 49.
146. Carothers, supranote 14, at 95-96.
147. See infra pp. 80-86.
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control. 148 Indeed, when the reformists in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary
Party ("MPRP") persuaded the party to accept the democratic demands, the
government's subsequent acts primarily sought to establish a (facially) democratic
system. 149

The first parliamentary act inspired by the reformists' pressure was purely
symbolic. In 1990, Parliament amended its 1960 constitution, deleting the article
which stated that the MPRP was the guiding force of the Mongolian state and its
society - Mongolia was to be a multi-party, democratic society. 5 o During July September of 1990, Mongolia experienced its first free parliamentary elections,
following other amendments that restructured the government and that allowed the
legal formation of opposition parties."' The MPRP earned a majority of the seats
in the People's Great Hural, but the Little Hural (the lower house of Parliament,
subsequently abolished) was representative of the competing political parties. 15 2
The first sessions of the Mongolian People's Great Hural (the new unicameral
Parliament) formally abolished the directives, ordinances and decisions that
constituted Mongolian law.153 "The society had once and for all decided to take a
leap from the rule of leaders to the rule of law."154
The first MPRP government's level of inclusiveness was astounding for a
party accustomed to full political control - the MPRP assigned four cabinet posts
to opposition parties.15 5 Much has been speculated about the reason for this
inclusive governing style. 156 Suffice it to say, it also invited a coalition
government after sweeping local elections two years later, in 1992.5
At a
minimum, the MPRP leaders have proven more adept at massaging the democratic
institutions to their favor than have the opposition leaders that initiated those
institutions.
Further, immediately following the elections, then-President Ochirbat created
a Constitution Drafting Commission, led by three majority MPRP members, but

148. Joseph E. Lake, First Resident U.S. Ambassador to Mongolia, Perspectives on Early Political
Change, Speech at A Conference in Celebration of Tenth Anniversary of The Asian Foundation's
Mongolian Program (Sep. 11, 2000), in THE ASIA FOUNDATION, MONGOLIA'S POLITICAL AND
EcoNOMIC TRANSITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (2000).
149. Id. at 4-5.
150. Alan J.K. Sanders, Mongolia's New Constitution, 32 ASIAN SURV. 506, 510 (1992)
(explaining how amendments to the 1960 constitution created a bicameral government for a short time
and created the posts of president and vice-president).
151. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 463.
152. Id. at 464.
153. Sanders, supra note 150, at 506.
154. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT 5 (2000).

155. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 464.
156. Id. at 464-65 (listing the possibilities as such: first, because of a generational change in the
MPRP, the young party leaders actually had more in common with their opponents; second, that the
only free-market economics experts were in opposition parties, thus necessitating a coalition
government; and third, that the MPRP deftly put opposition leaders in charge of economics posts, in
order to have a scapegoat in the inevitable case of economic decline).
157. Id. at 467.
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with representation from all political parties.1 5 8 Additionally, any proposed
amendments to drafts were open to the public, with the only requirement that they
be submitted through the proper channels to the Commission by September 1,
1991.159

Mongolia's natural path towards effective democratic governance was
impressive, given its history. Not only did Mongolia's initial reforms kick off with
panache, the government officials in charge were serious about the thoroughness of
their tasks, completely remaking their constitution in the modern mold after the
Constitutional Committee reviewed one hundred foreign constitutions for

comparison.160
Mongolia's new constitution was formally ratified in early 1992, rescinding
immediately the 1960 constitution. 16 1 The 1992 constitution is a modern
constitution in the new European style, giving elevated status to human rights and
social safety.
The Asia Foundation supported the drafting of the new
constitution.162
The Foundation assisted the delegation of Mongolian
parliamentarians who visited the U.S. to study its Congress and government
institutions, and funded an American delegation of legal specialists who gave
lectures and seminars in Mongolia on constitutional law and human rights. 163
After the draft constitution was circulated to the public for comment in June of
1991, The Foundation had several leading American constitutional experts
contribute their commentary for the parliamentarians to consider. 16 4
With their new Constitution firmly established but untested, Mongolia turned
its attention to creating a market economy and enacting legislation to implement
the Constitution. Mongolia, like other post-Leninist countries, searched for an
optimal law regime in an era of globalization and law convergence.165 For this
intricate task, Mongolia's leadership was ill-equipped to make the transition alone.

158. Sanders, supra note 150, at 511.
159. Id. at 510 (discussing the different drafts and the changes made to them, and noting that the
International Commission of Jurists assisted the formation of the first draft). In fact, in addition to the
International Commission of Jurists, representatives from the Asia Foundation, USAID, the diplomatic
community in Ulaanbaatar and foreign experts reviewed the constitution's drafts and made suggestions.
This was probably the first collusion in legal reform between the Mongolian government and
international organizations and foreign governments.
160. Tom Ginsburg and Ganzorig Gombosuren, When Courts and Politics Collide: Mongolia's
ConstitutionalCrisis, 14 COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 309, 310 (2000).
161. Sanders, supra note 150, at 506.
162. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, THE ASIA FOUNDATION & MONGOLIA: A TEN YEAR HISTORY 1

(2000).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. There are numerous foundations, international organizations and governmental agencies and
groups assisting legal and judicial reform in Mongolia, all ostensibly advancing the rule of law. See
United Nations Dev. Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report Mongolia 51-52 (2003). The
ones who have been the most contributory are, in no particular order: the National Center for State
Courts of the United States; United States Agency for International Development (USAID); Asian
Development Bank; World Bank; The Asia Foundation; United Nations Development Program
(UNDP); Hans Siedel Foundation; German Technical Cooperation Association (GTZ); the Soros
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Mongolia received extensive technical assistance from international
organizations and used its newly formed bilateral relationships to enlist the legal
and technical assistance of donor countries.166 To its benefit, Mongolia had a
respectable starting point: Eastern Europe and Central Asian ex-Soviet satellites
already had stumbled through a few years of growing pains. Indeed, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and German Development
Corporation (GTZ) were experienced legal reform advisors by the time they
entered Mongolia in 1990.167 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) began
working with Mongolia's government in 1991.168 To all parties involved, the goal
was to create a market economy, a multi-party system, and a democratic
governance structure. 169
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM MONGOLIAN LEGAL REFORMS AND THE WORK OF
DONOR ORGANIZATIONS

Thejustice ofMongolia should become a Mongolianproduct.17 0
It is neither apparent nor likely that Mongolia or its donors used any
procedurally-minimalist formulation of rule of law or any analogous guide for its
initial reforms. 171 Instead, they engaged in many reforms on an as-needed basis. 172
Nonetheless, over time, Mongolia and its donor agencies touched on nearly every
single stage of rule of law promotion. 173
Mongolia's experiences demonstrate four important lessons to future rule of
law promotion: (1) judicial independence is the cornerstone of the rule of law; (2)
formal government action plans offer "more bang for your buck;" (3) public
participation and sentiment is a proxy for the institutionalization of the norms and
culture of the rule of law; and (4) the leverage of donor coordination pays
dividends.
A. Lesson One: JudicialIndependence Is The Cornerstoneof the Rule ofLaw
The importance ofjudicial independence seems self-evident, but a remarkable
number of rule of law definitions omit it as a factor or put it very low on the

Foundation and Open Society Institute (OSI); and PACT.
166. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 7.

167. See USAID, Brief Chronology and Highlights of the History of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Activities, http://www.usaid.gov/about usaid/chronology.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2010); GTZ, The
1990s - A Dynamic Decade, http://www.gtz.de/en/unternehmen/29091.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
168. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK & MONGOLIA: FACT SHEET 6

(2008).
169. Lake, supranote 148, at 5.
170. B. Chimid, Advisor to the Parliament, The New Constitution of Mongolia and Legal Reform,
Speech at A Conference in Celebration of Tenth Anniversary of The Asian Foundation's Mongolian
Program (Sep. 11, 2000), in THE ASIA FOUNDATION, MONGOLIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
TRANSITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 26-30 (2000).

171. See Cheung, supranote 10, at 70-72.
172. See infra Appendix B for a detailed summary of Mongolia's rule-of-law reforms and the donor
institutions that assisted these reforms.
173. Id.
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hierarchy of essential values. 174 The Mongolian experience highlights the
importance ofjudicial independence.
Mongolia has had some difficulties with judicial independence for a few
fundamental reasons. First, during its socialist past, the executive controlled the
judiciary, which the executive utilized as another way for the state to exercise
control over the country. Accordingly, judges occupied a lower status and decided
cases and implemented decisions based on party lines and executive directives.
Second, the continuity of the Mongolian communist party and continued party
affiliation negatively affect judicial independence. The MPRP continues to be in
power (although under a reformulated democratic basis) and many of the present
judges on the bench were and continue as MPRP members. Thus, there is a close
interrelation between the past and the present, and the executive and legislative
branches continue to influence the attitudes and decisions of some judges. The
third main factor affecting judicial independence is the difficulty in changing legal
psychology from communist times.
In Mongolia and other similarly situated states, an early and targeted focus on
judicial independence would be appropriate. The ftndamental barriers to the
establishment of judicial independence in Mongolia were not adequately dealt with
during the first six years of reforms, until the government of Mongolia and the
donor community had turned to judicial reform projects. But, two failures have
resulted in Mongolia's judiciary having a precarious independence: the failure to
acknowledge the fact that judicial independence is a cornerstone to the rule of law;
and the failure to acknowledge the seriousness of the impediments to the
establishment of judicial independence in Mongolia and then dedicate money and

programs to removing those impediments.
Donors provided a great deal of focus on the General Council of Courts
(GCC), which controls the management of the judiciary, including the budget,
selects judges and undertakes disciplinary proceedings of justice sector
employees. 175 As mentioned above, the creation and implementation of a judicial
council supports an independent judiciary and embodies it with the freedom and
strength to challenge governmental actions that hinder the rule of law.
The General Council of Courts, mandated by Article 49 of the Constitution of
Mongolia to assure judicial independence, has twelve members: the Chief Justice,
the General Prosecutor, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs (MOJHA), a
Secretary appointed by the President, two members appointed by the Supreme
Court, two by the Parliament, two representing the Aimag and Capital City courts,
and two representing the courts of first instance. 176

174. See discussionsupra Part IIA.
175. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR THE FUTURE 10

(2009), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/

pdf docs/PDACO255.pdf.
176. WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT 7 (2001) (discussing the state of the

judiciary).
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Although the majority of the membership comes from the judiciary, there is
significant representation by the executive and legislative branches, compromising
the independence of this body and the judiciary branch.17 7 There has not been any
indication that the membership composition will change in the near future. Indeed,
Ganzorig Gombosuren, a former Supreme Court Justice, argued that this executive
oversight influenced the GCC and reduced its independent decision-making
capacity, resulting in its decision not to renew his nomination.178 The International
Commission of Jurists relates this incident.
Ganzorig Gombosuren - Retired Judge of the Supreme Court of Mongolia:
Mr. Ganzorig Gombosuren served as a Judge of the Supreme Court of
Mongolia for eight years and left the Court in 1998 to take a master in
law degree in the United States. When he returned to Mongolia in
March 2001 he was nominated by the Supreme Court to be appointed as
a judge again. In spite of his prior service, he had to take a test that the
Judicial Professional Committee has established as a first step in order
to ensure the adequate qualification of candidates. He was unsuccessful
on the test and was therefore not recommended by the General Council
of Courts to the President for renewed appointment. The General
Council of Courts rejected his request to reconsider this decision.
Reportedly, the majority of the members of the General Council of
Courts at first voted in his favour, but after the Minister of Justice, who
was Chairman of this body, made comments to his disadvantage, the
second round of voting confirmed the negative decision not to renew his
nomination . . . . According to Ganzorig Gombosuren, the de facto

reason behind his rejection is that he has been active in promoting the
independence of the judiciary in Mongolia. In December 1993 he and
his colleagues established the Mongolian Group for the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers to support judicial independence and legal reform
in Mongolia. He has also written a number of articles in newspapers and
law journals, spoken on TV and on the radio, and in law schools and
conferences. 179
As this anecdote demonstrates, judicial independence is precarious in
Mongolia, in part because of executive oversight of the judiciary by the Ministry of
Justice. Donors have had to implement reforms within the reality of this
framework, and have thus focused on increasing transparency and accountability
and improving public relations.8 0
The GCC has been criticized for having a hierarchical management style, an
inadequate budget and a small and poorly trained staff, all of which constrain the

177. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, MONGOLIA: ATTACKS ON JUSTICE 263-64 (2002),

available at http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/mongolia.pdf
178. Id. at 268-69.
179. Id.
180. USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 5.
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creation or implementation of the rule of law.18 1 The other branches of
government have not made enough human and fiscal resources available to the
GCC, to assist in its judicial reforms of accountability and transparency. 182 As
well, within the leadership of the GCC, there has not been significant willingness
to modernize its decision-making process to give the judiciary more control over
its branch and independence vis-A-vis the other branches of government.1 8 3 This
could result from the existence of membership from the executive and the
legislative branches in the Council.
Apart from institutional issues with the judicial council, status, continuity, and
legal psychology were barriers to an independent judiciary. At the time of its
transformation, Mongolia's judges and legal professionals had no training in
adjudicating disputes in a market economy, and their mindset remained that of the
communist era - viewing the judiciary is an instrument of state power, not an
independent branch of government. 18 4 In addition to basic market-economy
training and changing the mentality of the judiciary, the donors focused on
teaching the many newly-passed laws, which included whole sectoral changes. 8
Judges have "had to adjust to a rapidly changing legislative environment,
particularly in the civil area. Although most of the judges have attempted to
familiarize themselves with the new legislation, there are still some who base
decisions on their old knowledge as they find it difficult to keep up with the
changes. Their experience in the application of commercial laws is limited, and
many find the unfamiliar situations of a market economy that they are faced with
confusing."l 8 6 Mongolia's judges and other legal professionals have had to absorb
the many changes in the law, and then decide how to prosecute, administer, or

implement these laws. This was particularly difficult since many of the new laws
were poorly drafted, overlapping or inconsistent.1 7 Mongolia and the donor
organizations have managed these challenges through the creation of judicial
training centers, as further discussed in the lesson on donor coordination.18
Overall, given Mongolia's unique cultural and institutional attributes, the
donor community should have recognized the fundamental value of judicial
independence and dedicated attention and resources to identifying and then
overcoming impediments to the independence of the judiciary in Mongolia.

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 12, 17-18, 20-21.
Id. at 17
Id. at 18-20
See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM

PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS

supra note 175, at 4-8 (discussing how the
attitudes of the judiciary were slow to respond to the Constitution's adoption of an independent
judiciary as a third branch of government).
185. See infra Appendix B.
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FuTURE,

186. DEVELOPING MONGOLIA'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK: A NEEDS ANALYSIS, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT

BANK 32 (1995), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Papers/Mongolia
/thejudges.asp?p=lawdevt.
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Instead, work on the judiciary was largely ignored during the first six years of
independence while necessary legislative reforms took precedence.
As will be further shown in the other rule of law lessons, the precariousness
of judicial independence leads to serious societal problems, namely corruption and
perceptions that there is no rule of law, thereby ensuring that people do not access
the judiciary in the case of disputes, and instead engage in corrupt exchanges or
"black market justice."
B. Lesson Two: Formal Government Action Plans Offer "More Bang for Your
Buck"
This lesson recognizes the inherent limitation of exhaustible resources of a
donor state or donor institution. The resources that a donor would be able to offer
is limited to budget constraints and the political willingness to commit money,
resources and personnel to the establishment of the rule of law in a donor-recipient
country. For instance, after September 11, 2001, the United States focused its
state-promoted programs and money predominantly on Afghanistan and Iraq, its
two main foreign policy commitments. 189 In that regard, resources and even
commitments can be pulled from recipient states and recommitted elsewhere.
Recognition of the inherent limitation of exhaustible resources would aid the
provision of rule of law assistance. The experience of Mongolia demonstrates that
formal government action plans offer one method of counteracting that inherent
limitation.
Mongolia's legislative reforms can be divided into two phases, each with a
distinct hallmark. 190 Phase one was the "uncoordinated emergency reforms," and
had as its hallmark ongoing political strife and disorganization between the
government and its donors, as well as among the donor community itself 191 Phase
two was the "government reform plans" that had as its hallmark formal
government plans to direct the various branches of government and its government
agencies and employees, as well as civil society and the donor community, which
resulted in a more dynamic, lasting and comprehensive reform process. 192 The
formal government action plans resulted in numerous benefits, including by
signaling formal government "buy-in" of some of the earlier reforms and norm
creation; offering guidance to the executive, legislation and judicial branches as to
the next phase of reform; broadening and deepening the reform process; and
pushing the donor community to work together as an effective "single
organism."193

189. See generally
OVERVIEW
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FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTORY

(2004), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/

organization/31987.pdf.
190. The phases discussed herein are the author's conclusions concerning the effectiveness of
Mongolia's legal reforms. See B. Chimid, supranote 170, at 12.
191. Id. at 12-13.
192. Id. at 12-14.
193. Id. at 13-14.
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Judicial reforms mostly occurred during phase two and as such, have been
more thoughtful and complete. Reforms of the judiciary began modestly with the
1993 Law on Courts, which mandated a reduction in the number of courts, an
increase in the number of judges and the establishment of higher eligibility
standards for appointment to the bench. 194 After the passage of this restructuring,
Parliament did little to advance the judiciary and its legal institutions. For some
reason, there seems to have been a lack of attention to judicial reform between
1994 and 1998. This could be the result of the balance of powers crisis and
deadlock in Parliament during those years. Conversely, it could be the result of
needed attention to reforming the economic system to become a market-based
system and reforming the political system to become a multi-party democracy.
Regardless, the institutional strengthening of the judiciary stalled, while free
market and economic reforms continued.
The lesson to be learned by the power of formal government action plans,
however, begins with the reform of legislation. From 1992 to 1998, the State
Great Hural enacted nearly 180 independent laws and approved over 200
amendments, and Mongolia joined nearly 60 international agreements and
treaties. 195 Following Mongolia's democratic transition, the legal reform process
was intense and immediate. On the whole, the GTZ has been the greatest stimulus
of the legislative reforms in Mongolia, and much of the new civil legal code
closely approximates German law. 196 A likely reason for the prevalence of the
GTZ in legislative reform is the fact that the GTZ undertook similar reform
projects in the former Soviet republics. 197 Essentially, the GTZ's previous
expertise in the recodification of the civil and criminal codes in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia was available immediately to Mongolia.1 98
Despite the success in the sheer number and breadth of the passage of new
laws, Mongolia had substantial difficulty with its phase one legislative reforms.
This was due in large part because, for the first six years of its democracy, the
government undertook reforms without a comprehensive program in place.
All donor outcomes could have been better if agreements on strategic
frameworks could have been reached for more sectors .... While initial
technical assistance ... helped to change the thinking toward a marketbased economy (particularly within the Ministry of Finance and the
Central Bank), many aspects of the institutional framework for a
market-based economy remain fragile (lack of compliance with new

194. THE AsIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 2.
195. See Tsend Munkhorgil, Justice Minister, Government of Mongolia, Speech at the Investor's
Forum: Legal Reform in Mongolia, available at http://www.mol.mn/modules.php?name=News&file=
print&sid=7611. (A noteworthy piece of legislation is Mongolia's liberal Mining Law, said to be
among the best in the world).
196. See WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 22.
197. See GTZ, Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/574.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2010).
198. Id.
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laws and regulations, weak institutional capacity and resources, and
poor accountability of public service delivery). 199
Inadequate methods and practice of legislative drafting has been an additional
major cause of legal disorder. "Legal science is just not present there."200 In
addition to better legal drafting, there was little coordination of legislative drafting
among the donors and all members of parliament, which could have been a system
for checking the consistency and relevance of legislation.201
Indeed, much of donors' subsequent assistance in legislative reforms occurred
to amend previously enacted laws that were poorly drafted, inconsistent with other
obligations and laws, or simply improper for Mongolia given its unique history and
cultural attributes.202 These early laws were developed without any single policy
in mind, and without effective planning or integration.
Then-Deputy Justice Minister, Ts. Munkhorgil, later concluded that during
the early years of reform, the "failure to enact economic laws in mutually
consistent and comprehensive ways so as to be able to set up a legal framework of
market relations, with the enforcement mechanism defined optimally .

.

. might

have a negative impact on economic reform."203 Further, he considered that "the
differences and specific features of [foreign] legal systems were disregarded with
laws and regulations of different countries taken as a model. All this led to such
negative consequences, as incompatibility of laws and inappropriate mechanism
for their enforcement." 204
It seems that reforming the legal code with assistance from donor countries
has resulted in transplantation effects - whereby laws from Germany, for example,
were not appropriate for Mongolia's culture. In fact, one can easily surmise that
much of the impetus in specific legal reforms - as well as in the pace and direction
of reforms - came not from Mongolian leadership but from donor countries and
donor organizations willing and hoping to remake Mongolia in its own vision.
To be fair, most Mongolian government officials had little expertise in market
systems and did not understand even the patent impact that certain legislation
would have.205 Thus, it is fair to say that these leaders did not foresee the latent
199. WORLD BANK, MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF A COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY OF THE WORLD
BANK GROUP FOR MONGOLIA 12 (2004) [hereinafter WORLD BANK COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY
2004], available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/MONGOLIAEXTN/Resources/CAS_ Mongolia
2004.pdf.
200. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 154, at 28-29
(quoting Supreme Court Justice Hon. A. Dorjgotov. A course on legislative drafting is no longer taught
in the standard law-school curriculum, and needs to be reintroduced in the curriculum to cure drafting in
the future. Law students need to be taught critical and analytical thinking, to understand the policies
underlying the laws, for better legal drafting, coordination of laws and interrelating of laws.)
201. Id.
202. See e.g., Munkhorgil, supranote 195.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Dan Southerland, Mongolia: A DemocraticBreakthrough, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 31,
2009,http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1231/Mongolia-a-democratic
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and long-term implications of certain legislation. Whether or not the donor
organizations understood these implications and whether they communicated such
dangers to the leadership is uncertain. Nonetheless, these donors impacted the
reform of the legislation greatly, and bear at least part of the fault in the resulting
negative consequences.
As a result of these discrepancies and early failures in these phase one
reforms, the government decided to change the structure within which the previous
legislation occurred. In the view of this author, the clear demarcating line between
the phase one reforms and the phase two reforms in Mongolia was the passage in
January of 1998 of the "Legal Reform Program of Mongolia" by the State Great
Hural.206 The purpose of the Legal Reform Program is to implement the objective
of "developing a human, civil and democratic society," to define basic guidelines
of work of state organization and officers at all levels, and to create a legal
framework and favorable environment to ensure political, social and economic
development and progress in compliance with the principles and concepts
proclaimed in the Constitution.207
In an elemental sense, the Legal Reform Program articulated a framework for
the government and civil society to implement the rule of law. In order to guide
key stakeholders in the creation of this framework, the Act articulates six
objectives: (i) development of the legal basis for ensuring the sovereignty of
Mongolia; (ii) perfection of the legal basis of economic relations; (iii) ensurance of
human
rights
freedoms
and
its
legal
guarantees;
(iv) perfection of the legal basis of state structure; (v) creation of the environment
for legal reform; (vi) perfection of the training of legal professionals; and (vii)

broadening of participation of Mongolia in international legal regulations.208
The Legal Reform Program has been one of the fundamental pieces of
legislation since Mongolia's democratization. It created the framework for further
reforms and defined the policies and principles that the State Great Hural should
follow in future legislation. Importantly, as well as improving legislation, it
deepened the reform process. For example, the State Great Hural subsequently
passed the "Guidelines for Improvement of Legislation of Mongolia for Period Up
to 2004," which listed over 40 laws to be enacted in six main areas. 209 The
government complied with these guidelines and also passed measures "to set up a
system of studying enforcement and impact of legislation, carrying out monitoring
and making assessment."2 10
One of the principal benefits of the Legal Reform Program has been to guide
the substantial amount of donor activity in assisting further legislative reforms.
Donor activity became particularly helpful after Mongolia passed the well-crafted

breakthrough.
206. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 40.
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"Law on Non-Government Organizations" in 1997.211 Donors such as the Asia
Foundation began to influence the reform process by working with new interest
groups and domestic NGOs, as well as members of government.2 12 As well, NGOs
have taken a more active and direct role in influencing the reformation process.
After some tepid initial moves, Mongolian society began to interact with the
government to influence the passage of specific laws (whereas previous agitation
occurred to stimulate general ideals - like a democratic revolution). The benefit of
the legal reform program in part has been for Mongolians to take more ownership
over the path of the reform process.
For instance, NGOs with the support of donors played a formative role in the
passage of the new Family Law in 1999.213 Additionally, The Asia Foundation
assisted in the revision of the 25-year old Family Law to reflect the changed social
and economic conditions of Mongolia.214 The Foundation provided support for a
seminar to discuss subjects of amendments, such as domestic violence, joint
property, and social benefits.215
Another example illustrates the confluence of donors with domestic actors. In
1999, The Asia Foundation supported the Political Education Academy of
Mongolia to study the Constitution, its organic laws and its impact on
government.216 This exercise has contributed to the development of Mongolian
democratic and constitutional studies, and it should lead to constitutional changes
to increase efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability of the
government.217 Partly because of these efforts, in December of 1999, the State
Great Hural passed the first amendments to the Constitution.218
Although the Legal Reform Program created the atmosphere for positive rule
of law reform, there was a risk that no subsequent enactments would guide or
implement the rule of law. In this vein, the government recognized the need for
more guidance and implementation and subsequently passed various government
action plans, further signaling a divide between phase one and phase two
reforms.2 19
Although they were probably not intended to do so, these action plans
embody a procedurally-minimalist rule of law definition, and focus on the creation
of norms and concepts, rather than ends-based goals. They closely follow the

211. Tom Ginsburg, Mongolia in 1997: Deepening Democracy, 38 ASIAN SURV. 64, 65 (Jan.
1998).
212. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 3.
213. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, BUILDING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MONGOLIA 2 (2000).
214. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 4.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Stewart Fenwick, The Rule of Law in Mongolia -- Constitutional Court and Conspiratorial
Parliament, FED'N PRESS, http://digital.federationpress.com.au/pageview/3aj4a/9nO61/17 (last visited
Feb. 13, 2010).
219. See generally WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note
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suggestions of this article's rule of law formulation, with an appropriate
overarching emphasis on norm creation, especially in the judiciary.
Suffice it to say, the reforms that occurred after these government action plans
were superior to those that preceded them. The contrast between reform of
legislation (many reforms occurred before the plans) and judicial reforms (most
reforms occurred after the government plans) demonstrates the importance of these
plans. To be clear, these action plans affected the legal and judicial reforms in two
ways - (i) they implemented a more detailed framework to guide the passage of
future legislation and reforms and (ii) they mandated and embodied the rule of law
in the work of Mongolia's branches of government, and the donor organizations
consulting them.
Donor coordination accelerated after the release of the Legal Needs
Assessment, which was funded in part by the Danish International Development
Agency (DANIDA) and administered by the World Bank's Mongolian Legal and
Judicial Reform Project. 22 0 World Bank officials implemented the assessment
process with the assumption that the country itself must design the course of
action.221 There was much institutional disagreement with this theory, as it was not
usual World Bank practice to cede control of the agenda to the donor-recipient
state.222 However, World Bank staff members that were supportive of this idea
were able to exert enough pressure on obstructions within the World Bank system
to overcome these doubts.223
The assessment utilized the guidance of the Government's Legal Reform
Program, and it was designed to further achieve the government's stated goals.224
The assessment culminated in the identification for assistance of the following
areas: (i) legislative drafting: development and coordination; (ii) judicial and
criminaljustice reform; (iii) legal profession: improvement of legal education and
bar development; (iv) legal scholarship: development of materials and research
databases; (v) public awareness: dissemination of legal information; and (vi)
coordination and harmonizationof internationaltreaties.225

220. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 3.

221. This conclusion is based on the author's off the record discussions with an official of the
World Bank while in Mongolia.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. The Legal Needs Assessment assessed the major problems affecting the efficiency of the
newly shaped legal system; identified programs that were needed to further legal reform activities;
provided information to external donor community for designing of legal reform projects and for
coordination of ongoing activities; and coordinated efforts of government, parliamentarians, judiciary,
scholars and civil society to assess their needs of legal and judicial reform. See WORLD BANK,
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A PROPOSED LEARNING AND INNOVATION CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT
OF SDR 4.0 MILLION (US$5.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO MONGOLIA FOR A LEGAL AND JUDICIAL

REFORM PROJECT 4-5 (2001), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS
ContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/01/07/000094946 01121708452144/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
[hereinafter WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT]; WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA:
LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 154, at 15-16.

225. Id.
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The Legal Needs Assessment was direct, comprehensive, and signaled to the
state that the government direction imposed by the Legal Reform Program was
acceptable to the donor community and the domestic constituencies.226 A principal
benefit of the assessment was that it resulted in a sincere societal buy-in of the
assessment's conclusions by both government actors and citizens, since it was
designed and administered by domestic actors. Many of these same domestic
actors then designed and endorsed the resulting legal reform plans that arose from
the legal reform program and assessment. Although the assessment was unusual
and it likely would be difficult to repeat in many donor organizations - even its
source, the World Bank - it should be held up as a prototype, as it has resulted in
many tangible benefits.
Following in the wake of the Legal Needs Assessment, on May 4, 2000 the
government of Mongolia passed its first government action plan, the "Strategic
Plan for the Justice System of Mongolia." 22 7 This plan identified the direction of
the development of the judiciary within the framework of the overall Legal Reform
Plan and sets strategic goals to define the judicial reforms. 228 A working group
that involved representatives of all judiciary bodies and experts of USAID
prepared the Strategic Plan.229
The Strategic Plan identified six fundamental values: (i) independence: that
the judiciary protects its political, economic, organizational and decision-making
independence; (ii) accountability: ability to use public resources efficiently
including personal accountability on the part of all individuals who work in the
justice system; (iii) responsiveness: ability of the justice system to anticipate and
timely

respond

to

the

changing

needs

of

society;

(iv) fairness: ability to treat all with respect and to apply only the law; (v)
accessibility: ability of the justice system to be convenient, timely and affordable
to everyone with a legitimate claim or concern; and (vi) effectiveness: ability to
uphold and apply the law consistently throughout the country.230
This Strategic Plan is extraordinary because, rather than calling for ends (such
as an online court database), it mandated the establishment of values that are the
equivalent to norms of the rule of law. These values represent process-oriented
reforms and closely relate to the procedurally-minimalist rule of law. An analysis
of each of the values clearly corresponds to the rule of law formulation described
above; in particular, this plan establishes the framework to implement the second

226. See WORLD BANK, IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT ON A LEARNING
AND INNOVATION CREDIT OF XDR 4.0 MILLION (US$5.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO MONGOLIA FOR A
JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM PROJECT 6-7 (2001), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external
/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/08/21/000333037 20090821003929/Rendered/PDF/ICR8
770P074001 1C0disclosed081181091.pdf.
227. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 175, at 5; WORLD BANK,
MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 31.
228. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 30-3 1.
229. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supranote 224, at 5.
230. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 30-3 1.
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essential value, the second primary quality and all of the secondary qualities of the
rule of law. Most importantly, this Strategic Plan calls for an integrated approach
to the rule of law (at least in the judiciary) where norms of universal value create
an umbrella structure in which to generate specific ends that assist the
procedurally-minimalist rule of law. The linchpin of this strategy is the USAIDfunded Judicial Reform Program (JRP), which will be discussed below.231
Overall, the Government of Mongolia and donors have promulgated many
new concepts in the justice system, and the adoption and implementation of these
concepts in a coordinated fashion has been difficult. An emphasis on training new
and established judges in these concepts somewhat has mitigated these difficulties.
Apart from some conceptual confusion, judicial reforms mostly have been
successful. The judicial sector has been modernized, and its court management
and processes have been automated to increase efficiency, transparency,
accountability and fairness.232 The judiciary is becoming more professional, and is
engaged in training to learn the new legal codes, and how to implement them. As
well, there have been significant efforts to reduce corruption and increase judicial
independence.233 The challenge for Mongolia and its donors will be to move
beyond the "introduction" of these new approaches and ensure that they are
actually "embedded" and "institutionalized" within the legal profession.
Further, since the government reform plans, legislative reforms have been
passed in a coordinated fashion. While some technical and drafting issues persist,
donor coordination and guidance by the government of Mongolia has resulted in
the passage of laws that are cleaner, clearer and appropriate for the circumstances
of Mongolia. 3 4

The deepening of the reform process, leading in particular to

judicial reforms, has helped to ensure that the implementation of these laws by
judges and practitioners has become more accurate and appropriate.
While it is clear that in the case of a total societal implosion, there is an
immediate need to begin to pass laws to structure a new society, the case of
Mongolia demonstrates that as soon as it is possible, the government and the donor
community should pass a government reform plan that will guide future reforms.
These plans can identify specific needs, and, more fundamentally, contain
important norms and notions that should guide the passage of laws and rules, and
their subsequent implementation. For a variety of reasons, including clarity, buyin, guidance, and comprehensiveness, these government reform plans offer the
most bang for the buck.

231. See National Center for State Courts International, Mongolia - Mongolia Judicial Reform
Project, http://www.ncscinternational.org/x/DocumentViewer.aspx?DocumentlD=683 (last visited
Feb. 9, 2010); USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE,

supra note 175, at 4.

232. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE,

233. Id. at 5, 10-11.
234. See id.at 7-8.

supranote 175, at 6-11.
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C. Lesson Three: Public Participation and Sentiment is a Proxy for the
Institutionalizationof the Norms and Culture of the Rule ofLaw
This article puts forth a definition of the rule of law that focuses in large part
on the creation of the norms and culture of the rule of law. While the
institutionalization of norms through legislation is a stepping stone, as would be
the case where a law formally makes the judiciary independent, there are a variety
of other factors that impede the true institutionalization of those norms. Indeed,
some of those impediments are apparent facially, such as the particular legal
history of Mongolia and the recent control of the judiciary by the Communist
party. Others are more nuanced and thus difficult to identify. Because of the
difficulty of direct identification of the creation and implementation of these
norms, practitioners could utilize a proxy to aid in such an identification.
One proxy for whether the culture and norms of the rule of law are being
adopted is public participation and public sentiment. In short, whether the public
is participating in the passage of laws, in elevating disputes to the judiciary, and in
other aspects of the rule of law actually indicates whether those norms and culture
are being institutionalized.235 This proxy will provide gross direction (that is, not
nuanced) to the practitioner or researcher and would not permit a sophisticated
understanding (or if somehow enumerated, a statistically significant conclusion) of
whether a particular norm has been established. Nonetheless, it provides important
guidance to aid in a determination of the efficacy of the donors' assistance to a
donor-recipient and could provide an opportunity to change direction or refocus
efforts and aid as needed.
The experience of Mongolia provides a useful example. In Mongolia's
implementation of legal, judicial and societal reforms, the members of parliament
and government leaders enacted the first four years of reforms without proper
participation of the public. This was more or less expected since governmental
decision-making during the communist era was private and opaque, so most initial
reforms in the democratic era were nontransparent or minimally so. The fact that
there were very few NGOs or interest groups operating in Mongolia also
236
contributed to this lack of public participation.26 Mongolians simply were too
worried about their financial situation to invest energy in special interest reforms to
create a particular ideal within, or type of, a market economy.237 Anyways, very
few knew about the workings of a market economy. While it is difficult to state
with certainty which factor impeded public participation, the very fact that the
public was not a part of the process indicates that there was no culture of the rule
of law at the inception of the reforms.
As discussed above, only once there was a law on NGOs in place and
sufficient donor activity in this field, did the public actually and actively

236. See, e.g., Ginsburg,supra note 211, at 65.
237. See USAID, THE JUDIcIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 175, at 20; see WORLD BANK,
MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 6.
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238

participate.
Prior to that point, public participation was limited to mass protests
over faulty or hasty previous reforms. To its credit, Mongolia's leaders quickly
have recognized errors in new legislation, and enacted subsequent legislation to
remedy those problems.239
This awareness and willingness to rectify the earlier reforms is nowhere more
apparent as in electoral reforms. The parliamentary election of 1992 resulted in the
election of an overwhelming majority of representatives for the MPRP.240 Because
the opposition garnered 40% of the vote, but won only 5 out of 76 seats, the public
revolted and engaged in a stinging protest against the new government. 241 An
ensuing hunger strike by the Mongolia Democratic Union resulted in a negotiated
agreement to revise the election law, to enact a law for the independence of the
media from government control and interference,242 and to address the new
243
Previously, the MPRP had come to power under 76
problem of corruption.
single member districts, but after pressure from the opposition, who concentrated
their support in urban areas, the election law changed to a mixed system of districts
and proportional representation. 244
The Asia Foundation sponsored exchange programs and forums to develop
information for the revised election law, which was approved in 1992.245 The
revised election law paid dividends to the MPRP-opposition - the subsequent
national election resulted in a coalition ousting the MPRP and winning 47 of 76
seats in Parliament.246 The new election law also increased fairness and
accountability, by requiring all candidates to open separate finance accounts which
were subject to audits, by giving equal access to state-run media for campaign
purposes, and by liberalizing nomination processes. 4 7
The hunger strike also clearly identified corruption as a public issue and
exposed the sense that many of the key norms of the rule of law were not being
established or absorbed by the government actors.
Corruption in the judicial system is a root of corruption throughout society, as
it reduces the ability of a judiciary to freely mete out justice. Corruption displaces
the natural process of decision-making, and makes access to justice insignificant.
In a 2005 Transparency International corruption survey, Mongolia scored a 3.0 out
238. See Ginsburg, supranote 211, at 65.
239. As well, Mongolia has been receptive to social considerations arising from their reforms, such
as poverty, rural inequities, and the increased presence of street children. Id. For the most part,
Mongolia's commitment to democracy has allowed interest groups and NGOs to agitate to bring these
problems to the attention of the MPs, free from undue interference or violence by the government. Id.
240. Sheldon S. Severinghaus, Mongolia in 1994: Strengthening Democracy, 35 AsIAN SURV. 70,
70-71 (1995).
241. Id.
242. The State Great Hural finally passed the required Media Law on January 1, 1999, after hunger
strikes in 1995 protesting the failure to do so. See id. at 71.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 4.
246. Tom Ginsburg, Mongolia in 1996: FightingFire and Ice, 37 ASIAN SURV. 60, 61 (1997).
247. THE AsIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 4.
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of 10 on the corruption scale, indicating Rampant Corruption.
As well,
Mongolian surveys and public opinion polls indicated that after Customs,
249
Judicial
participants ranked Judicial Institutions as the most corrupt institution.
corruption greatly impacts the rule of law in that it operates as a disincentive for
the public to take complaints to judicial institutions for resolution. It impacts
meaningful access to justice principles, and negatively affects the rule of law in
that it prevents laws from being an actual guide, decreases the stability of the law
and renders the law far from supreme.
*

*

The recent Law on the Courts changes the process of judicial discipline by
including public participation.250 However, as of 2005, the implementation of this
aspect has yet to be realized. 25 1 Robert La Mont, the former and long-term director
of the JRP, suggested a suite of solutions to address judicial corruption in
Mongolia, as a first step to dealing with society-wide corruption.252 These
suggestions are typical suggestions to either face judicial corruption or increase
professionalism in a judiciary.
In terms of corruption, the twin towers of transparency and disincentives are
key tools. La Mont indicates that the inquisitorial procedures of the Mongolian
judiciary create a system where judges frequently meet ex parte with witnesses and
parties.253 Thus, there is ample opportunity for the passing of bribes. The new
Judicial Code of Ethics, however, did not contain a prohibition on ex parte
conversations, because an overwhelming majority of the judges objected.254 La
Mont also specified that salary levels that allow judges to meet their needs would
limit the possibility of bribe-taking.255 However, he notes that donor activity may
not have much effect, since the Mongolian government's finances dictates judicial
salary.256 He also indicates that the cost of corruption has been nearly non-existent
in Mongolia, as there has been little prosecution of judicial corruption, save for
cases of drunkenness on the job.257 Thus, while dishonest judges and judicial

248. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2005, http://www.transparency.org
/policy_ research/surveys indices/cpi/2005 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
249. See ROBERT LA MONT, SOME MEANS OF ADDRESSING JUDICIAL CORRUPTION INMONGOLIA 2
(2002), available at http://www.forum.mn/en/index.php?sel=resource&f-resone&objid=1 1&menu
id=3&resmenu id=35 (summarizing Mongolian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 2000 survey,
Annex 4, question 11).
250. See id. at 3 (stating that in the past, judicial discipline was initiated by chief justices and
decided by fellow justices, thus resulting in a bias against punishing colleagues).
251. This is personal knowledge relating from the author's experiences working at the Supreme
Court of Mongolia in the summer of 2005.
252. See LA MONT, supra note 249, at 6-8. These suggestions represent the views of the Mr. La
Mont and they are not official USAID policy.
253. Id. at 3.
254. Id. at 3-4.
255. Id. at 4-5.
256. Id. at 4. The one impact donors can have, however, is where the executive does not raise
salary levels in par with other governmental agencies, either as punishment for certain decisions, or to
limit judicial independence. Id. There, donors can pressure the executive to continually raise judicial
salaries where the budget allows. Id.
257. Id. at 3.
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La Mont suggests that there are a number of additional steps that can be taken
to limit judicial corruption: require random assignment of cases;29 require regular
analysis of case reassignment; require public access terminals for all automated
courts; require special rules of financial disclosure for judges, penalties in the
Judicial Ethics Code, and random audits by the GCC Ethics Committee; prohibit
ex parte conversations in the Judicial Ethics Code; train and provide equipment to
the Judicial Disciplinary Committee; and train and provide equipment to the
Prosecutor's corruption investigation unit.26 0
Not only does the public perception of corruption offer a proxy into the
establishment of the norms of the rule of law, it can be a negative influence in and
of itself. In particular, the public perception of corruption also influences actual
corruption regardless of whether those perceptions are mistaken.26 1 The more the
public perceives corrupt legal institutions, the more likely that the public will be
induced to make corrupt overtures, rather than settle for legal mechanisms to
resolve disputes. To combat this ongoing danger, MFOS coordinates a public
competition in conjunction with the Zorig Foundation.262 Together, they seek to
increase public awareness of corruption through the publication of anti-corruption
essays and posters that are collected in a nationwide competition.263
The JRP released a report in August of 2005, which shows that public
perception of the judiciary has improved significantly, and the JRP credits some of
that increase to its work in the area.264 Indeed, the JRP has instituted many of La
Mont's suggestions, including equipping and training the new Judicial Disciplinary
Committee, and equipping and training the new Special Investigative Unit of the
Prosecutor General, empowered with investigating crimes in the judiciary.265
During the socialist era, corruption only existed at the highest echelons of
government. 266 Small gifts and promises constituted the extent of influence
peddling on every other level. But now, with a market economy, privatization and
property rights, corruption has thrived.267 It is commonly known that corruption is
258. Id. at 2.
259. Id. at 6. This reform has been undertaken, although there is indication that the automatic case
management systems are not being used by all courts.
260. Id. at 6-8.
261. Id. at 2-3.
262. See ZORIG FOUNDATION, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT
SUPPORTED BY PTF 1 (2002), available at http://www.partnershipfortransparency.info/uploads/
completed%20projects/Mongolia % 2 0-%20Final%20report.pdf.
263. Id.
264. HEIKE GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2004)
(stating the JRP's intention to strengthen the management and procedures of the Special Investigative
Unit).
265. Id. at 3.
266. Verena Fritz, Democratizationand Corruptionin Mongolia, 27 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 191, 195
(2007).
267. See, e.g., J. OYUNTUYA, NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS COUNTRY REPORT:

MONGOLIA,

500

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:3

widespread in Mongolia.268 With free speech and a free media, stories of
corruption circulate within the media widely.
Civil society was the sector that first exposed corruption and began to educate
the public about the costs of corruption. Indeed, in the early part of this decade,
civic dialogue centered around this increasing corruption and its effects on society,
and what measures must be taken to prevent it.269 The Zorig Foundation created
public education campaigns and reported on this problem widely through surveys
and summaries. 270 The Zorig Foundation's efforts were assisted by the UNDP. 2 7 1
In response to these efforts, in 2002 the State Great Hural passed the National
Programme for Combating Corruption (NPCC) and the National Anti-Corruption
Action Plan (NAAP). 272 The UNDP's Anti-Corruption Program aims to support
the implementation of the NPCC and the NAAP. 2 73 These three actors - the
Parliament, the Zorig Foundation and the UNDP - created a Mongolian AntiCorruption website as an informative portal for Mongolians. 274
The four major components of the UNDP project are: (i) participatory priority
setting within the NPCC and the NAAP and the designation of the concrete
immediate elements that can provide visible evidence of forward movement of the
plan; (ii) broad public awareness on the complex issues of corruption and their
negative impact on human security and sustainable human development; (iii)
institutional capacity building to enforce, monitor, and evaluate the police, legal
and regulatory framework to combat corruption; and (iv) strengthening the
mechanisms necessary to improve the management, coordination, and monitoring
of the implementation of the NPCC.275
Donors have stimulated a multitude of anti-corruption efforts, including
creating a special anti-corruption prosecutor's office, automating and streamlining
caseloads, and reforming election legislation to create campaign-funding

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT (2001). See also NANCY
TAYLOR, MONGOLIA CASE STUDY IN ANTI-CORRUPTION (2003); USAID, ASSESSMENT OF
CORRUPTION IN MONGOLIA (2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/mn/documents/Mongolia
CorruptionAssessmentFinalReport.pdf; USAID, MONGOLIAN JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, PUBLIC
PERCEPTION OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION (2005), available at http://pdf.usaid.

gov/pdf docs/PDACG136.pdf.
268. See generally OYUNTUYA, supra note 267; TAYLOR, supranote 267; USAID, ASSESSMENT OF
CORRUPTION IN MONGOLIA, supranote 267; USAID, MONGOLIAN JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra
note 267.
269. See generally id.
270. See Zorig Foundation, http://www.zorigfoundation.org.mn (last visited Feb. 12, 2010). The
Zorig Foundation is an NGO named after the slain founder of Mongolian democracy. Id.
271. Id.
272. United Nations Development Programme, Completed Projects,Democratic Governance and
Human Rights, Anti-Corruption (National Integrity System Enhancement) in Mongolia (Nov 2004 Dec 2008), UNDP, http://www.undp.mn/dghr-ac.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
273. Id.
274. See The Mongolian Anti-Corruption Website, http://www.anticorruption.mn/index.php (last
visited Feb. 12, 2010).
275. United Nations Development Programme, supranote 272.
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transparency.26 These efforts are becoming more diverse, to meet the specific
instances of corruption. However, there are still strong criticisms of Mongolia's
efforts - primarily that its anti-corruption statute is flawed, that there is no
sufficient enforcement, and that there are no sufficient anti-corruption mechanisms
or bodies tasked with undertaking these efforts.277 Needless to say, corruption
remains Mongolia's largest impediment to advancing the rule of law and
democracy.
It appears that one of the main aspects that influenced the perception of
corruption in the judiciary is that the perception carried over from Mongolia's
communist past - that the decisions of the executive branch and its actors are
unassailable regardless of wrongfulness or illegality. Apparently in response to
this challenging vestige of its history, Mongolia and its donors enacted a major
initiative to establish an oversight mechanism for wrongful decisions made by the
executive branch, through the creation of an administrative court system.278
The Administrative Cases Courts (ACC) was established by the State Great
Hural in June of 2004.279 It represents a significant success and progress in the
improvement of the judicial system - in particular it creates accountability
procedures for challenging government decisions which threaten the rule of law.
The Law on Administrative Procedure governs the jurisdiction of these courts.280
In short, "any disputes which arise from an administrative act and which may
affect a person's rights may be challenged." 28 1 The implication is that the judiciary
now settles disputes between public authorities and individuals arising from the
exercise of public authority.
This specialized court system is considered as an essential guarantee of
the rule of law with emphasis on equity and fairness. The component
would include the refurbishing of allocated space for the functioning of
three pilot courts in Ulaanbaatar (Supreme Court and Capital City
Court) and one at a selected aimag (Darkhan), training all administrative
judges, public awareness campaign, introducing new techniques of case
and court management within these administrative courts and, gathering
and publication of data on court personnel and public opinion.282
Thus, the ACC uphold access to justice principles and accountability of
government decisions by public decision-makers. There is an ongoing concern

276. See infra Appendix B.
277. USAID, ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION IN MONGOLIA, supra note 267, at 2. See Brent T.

White, Rotten to the Core: Project Capture and the Failure of JudicialReform in Mongolia, 4 E. Asia
L. Rev. 209, 209 (2009).
278. Interview with various officials that were involved in the formation and staffing of the
administrative court system, Mongolia Supreme Court, in Ulaanbataar, Mongolia (2005). See generally
Odgerel Tseveen & Battsetseg Ganbold, The Mongolian Legal System and Laws: A Brief Overview,
GLOBALEX, (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Mongolia.htm.
279. Tseveen & Ganbold, supra note 278.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT, supranote 176, at 9.
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that the aimag (provincial) ACCs will not have a sufficient workload, and as a
result, there have been delays in deciding on the exact structure of the courts and in
filling available positions.283 However, it seems likely that the advent of the
administrative court will affect public perceptions of corruption in society, by
giving it recourse to legal institutions when wronged by administrative actions.
This goes far in creating a society-wide ethos of the rule of law.
At this point it seems that by and large, the legislature and the executive in
Mongolia accept the prerogative of the administrative courts and intend to comply
with decisions by these courts. However, at any time, if these high-level officials
decide not to abide by these decisions, the rule of law will be compromised
seriously. Judges from the Administrative Supreme Court seem to be waiting to
see what reaction the other branches of government will have to the work of the
administrative courts.284
As judged by the proxy of public sentiment and public participation in
Mongolia, there have been improvements in the rule of law, including the
establishment of a rule of law culture. Nonetheless, judging both by public
participation and public perception, such improvements appear to be tenuous in
Mongolia, and accordingly are at risk of backsliding. Nonetheless, the fact that the
donor community and Mongolian governmental actors have responded to the
failure of the public to participate or to its perceptions and demonstrations for
change is significant and is a foundation to a promising rule of law culture.
D. Lesson Four: The Leverage ofDonor CoordinationPays Dividends
One of the main benefits of the World Bank's Legal Needs Assessment was
the coordination of donor activities, which resulted in a comprehensive plan among
donors.285 Indeed, the accompanying report to the assessment complained that
"there is little effort made to coordinate project activities. In a nutshell, donors and
international institutions foster legal reform activities piece by piece without a
comprehensive approach."286 Donors took up this call to arms, and engaged in a
substantial amount of donor coordination of projects and funding, to reduce
217
competitive or duplicative efforts, as well as to combine the power of the purse.
The JRP has been the primary mechanism for donor coordination, after the
passage of the Legal Reform Program of Mongolia. JRP is a mixture of work from
the National Center for State Courts, the USAID, PACT, the Mongolian Open
Society Forum, and the German Technical Corporation (GTZ).288

283. Interviews with various officials, supranote 278.
284. Indeed, it seems that the other branches of government perhaps do not understand the full
implications of these administrative courts. Thus, there is a danger that once the first big decision is
adopted, there may be significant resistance to compliance, and backtracking away from an independent
administrative court.
285. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 13.
286. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 39.
287. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 39.

288. Id.
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The JRP works closely with the General Council of Courts (GCC) 28 9 to focus
on six major tasks: (i) provide hands-on policy advice and training, including
continuing legal education; (ii) build the capacity of legal institutions, to strengthen
court management; (iii) introduce new approaches to legal education, including
establishing legal professional qualifications; (iv) curb judicial corruption; (v)
improve legal ethics; and (vi) increase public awareness and information about
Mongolia's changing judicial landscape.290 In short, the JRP works towards
achieving the Justice System Plan, with particular focus on the Mongolianidentified objectives of "good governance" and "accountability."291
One significant criticism of the Judicial Reform Project is that their office is
located at the Ministry of Justice & Home Affairs, an executive agency, thereby
threatening judicial independence and compromising the integrity of the program.
Those charges appear to be meritless, however, as the Judicial Reform Project
seems to be impartial, well-executed and was headed by an extremely competent
American lawyer, Mr. Robert La Mont.
JRP produces a "Rule of Law" newsletter to assist donor coordination and
292
inform interested sectors of reform activities.22 By 2004, JRP nearly had
integrated its activities with the GTZ, particularly in public education and judicial
training, and closely coordinated its work with the World Bank's Judicial and
Legal Reform Project.2 93
However, the center that made the most impact in training has been the
National Legal Center on Legal and Judicial Research, Training, Information and
Publicity. 294 The JRP and other foreign donors, with the support of the World
Bank, assisted in the creation of the National Legal Center (NLC) formed in late
2002 .295 The NLC moved to a new Mongolian-designed building in a central
location in Ulaanbaatar on June 16, 2004.296 The NLC is one of the linchpins of
the Mongolian Legal and Judicial Reform Project, and gets most of its support
from the JRP and the World Bank's Legal and Judicial Reform Project. 297 It is
clear that the NLC usurped most if not all of the functions of its predecessors, and
the JRP and GTZ have provided the bulk of training and CLE programs to judges,
prosecutors and advocates.298

289. The General Council of Courts is responsible for the administration of the courts.
290. THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL AID, USAID/MONGOLIA, JUDICIAL
REFORM PROJECT FACT SHEET, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/pdf/JRP 061306.pdf.
291. USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 6, 11.
292. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 38.

293. Id. at 3.
294. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175.

295. Id. at 8.
296. See Mongolia Legal Center, http://www.legalcenter.mn (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
297. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175.

298. See id.
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The JRP continues working with the NLC to develop new courses and
undertake trainings. USAID has funded the training of virtually every judge in
Mongolia through a JRP-provided training program, mostly administered by the
GTZ.299 The NLC holds annual "Baby Judges" training course to introduce newly
appointed judges to best practices and to assist in their receivership of their
position. 300 The JRP also sponsored training in distant aimags, and inquired into
their estimation of their training needs, for future provision of services.301
The donor coordination that Mongolia's donors engaged in after the
government action plans and the legal needs assessment was remarkable and has
been held up as a model for future donor activity. The GTZ in particular refers to
this structure as a "best practice" in donor coordination.302 After donor
coordination began in earnest in 1999, the pace and depth of Mongolia's judicial
and other reforms increased tremendously and have created a promising context
for a deep and permanent rule of law culture and civil society.303 Certainly, the
engagement of donors with each other to create complementary activities and not
overlap has been an important factor in the success of Mongolia's reforms this
decade.
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS ON MONGOLIA'S LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORMS

Mongolia has made the transition from communism to freedom, and in
just 15 years, you've established a vibrant democracy and opened up
your economy. You're an example of success for this region and for the
world. I know the transition to liberty has not always been easy and
Americans admire your patience and your determination. By your daily
efforts, you're building a better life for your children and your
grandchildren. 304
Over the past two decades, Mongolia has moved towards a procedurallyminimalist definition of the rule of law. Overall, Mongolia's legal and judicial
reforms resoundingly have been successful, although they have not been without
problems. Donors have shown a great capacity to work together under unified
leadership, and have effected serious and deep change. Mongolians have
embraced their role and nongovernmental organizations have proliferated
(especially those started by women) and have stimulated the reform process. And
finally, Mongolia's leaders have shown a willingness to embrace honest and
suitable changes to their legal system, for the benefit of all Mongolians.

299. See Skip Waskin, JudicialReform Project Update, Q4 Updates 2005, USAID, Dec. 13, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q4-05.html.
300. Id.
301. Skip Waskin, Judicial Reform Project Update, Q3 Updates 2005, USAID, Sept. 15, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html.
302. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 40 (indicating that
the JRP is "seen by other donors as the focal point for legal and justice sector information and more and
more as the hub for rule of law coordination").
303. Heike Gramckow, The Long Winding Road: JudicialSector Reform in Mongolia, 2 INT'L JUD.
MONITOR 1, 1 (2007), http://wwwjudicialmonitor.org/archive_0207/sectorassessment.html.
304. Bush, supra note 12.
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In the beginning of its democracy, Mongolia did not have much direction over
the path of its reforms, as donor organizations and outside states influenced a large
amount of the legislation. Obviously, these donor organizations were working
with appropriate counterparts in Mongolia's government to enact the passage of
laws, implementation of new procedures, and restructuring of institutions. But
there was not a great deal of understanding by Mongolia's leaders of the exact
effects of the reforms. Likewise, in the initial stages, Mongolia's institutions did
not have any sectoral integration or cooperation amongst themselves, or even full
command over much of the reforms, resulting in poor implementation.
During the first seven years of its democracy, Mongolia and its donors
focused its reforms on legislation. Besides a slight restructuring of the courts, the
government and its donors engaged in modest work in the judiciary. New
legislation was imperfect as it was poorly drafted, difficult to implement,
overlapping and inconsistent. As it were, the initial response to many issues in
Mongolia was to draft a law or administrative procedure and as a result, the
enactment of laws has not proven to be careful or targeted solutions for Mongolia's
needs. Accompanying donor assistance in drafting laws has been transplantation
problems, where the laws or regulations of foreign jurisdictions are ill-suited to the
unique cultural context of Mongolia.
The tipping point, however, occurred when the government passed its reform
plans. The reforms occurring before the passage of the government action plans
were fundamentally flawed as they were not coherent or coordinated. Nonetheless,
the government action plans at the least showed that there was a high level of
acceptance for the pace and direction of the reform process that previously
occurred, despite shortcomings of the process. More importantly, after the process
of planning and memorializing an action plan, Mongolia's leaders gained a more
intimate understanding of and control over their reform situation.
As well, the Legal Needs Assessment by the World Bank and domestic
Mongolian actors was well-crafted and resulted in a societal buy-in, as it was
designed in part and administered by domestic actors. This type of assessment is
unusual and repeating it would be difficult in the present institutional bureaucratic
environment in many donor organizations. Nonetheless, the Mongolian experience
can be held up as a prototype, as it resulted in many tangible benefits, including the
creation of an administrative court system, which should operate to protect the
creation of a rule of law culture.
In addition to signaling high-level acceptance of the prior reforms, the
government action plans led to other tangible benefits as well. International
donors followed the government's prerogatives, and created their donor plans to fit
within the framework of the government's plans. The existence of these plans also
assisted the work of civil society to stimulate deeper reforms. Civil organizers and
leaders needed only to point to the appropriate section of the government plan,
how their work assists that goal, and then pressure for acceptance or assistance, as
the case may be.
The government action plans stimulated the donors to accept the JRP as a
donor clearinghouse and coordination center. As mentioned above, the GTZ uses
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Mongolian donor coordination as a best practice in the field of rule of law donor
assistance.305 Once the JRP began its donor coordination, donors were able to
minimize or discontinue duplicative or contradictory reforms.
The impact of these action plans cannot be understated. They created
concepts or norms as goals of rule of law reforms, rather than ends-based
institution-building. They affected the psychology of the Mongolian society, and
in particular, its leaders. Taking control over the reform process creates the belief
in the parliamentarians and civil society that they are the catalysts - and this will
make them more conducive to establishing a rule of law culture and accepting the
rule of law. Now, Mongolian justice can become a Mongolian product, since
many actors of society are taking part in the planning and decision-making in a
fixed and controlled framework.
Overall, judicial reforms largely have been successful. As with legislative
reforms, however, certain problems in the judiciary remain unresolved. Fixing the
procedural standards of the judiciary does not increase the rule of law ethos.
Increasing case-processing times, court administration and public access to
information creates needed transparency, but these technical fixes do not create
human change. Judges continue to be unwilling to embrace a more stringent ethics
standard and many of the "old guard" judges question the efficacy of most of the
reform programs. The plethora of new laws and procedures and the manifestation
of extraordinary disputes based on market circumstances have left many judges
confused, uncomfortable and ill-equipped to make good professional decisions.
During the first phase of democracy, judges in rural courts obstinately refused to
apply new laws, and used many of the outdated communist-era laws. It is unclear
to what extent this practice continues.
Training has increased the capacity of the individual judge, and procedural
and legal manuals have aided in the decision-making capability and uniformity of
the judiciary. Legal education is undergoing beneficent change, and experts agree
that it is improving and becoming standardized. Accreditation standards and bar
associations also are beginning to raise the professionalism of the judiciary.
Lastly, donors adeptly utilized public perception surveys to gauge the public's
knowledge, understanding and support for government institutions and the reform
process. After having discovered a low level of confidence in the judiciary and
other institutions, Mongolia and its donors responded effectively and engaged in
reforms that raised public confidence. Without a public buy-in, the creation of the
norms of the rule of law, as embodied in the action plans, would not be sustainable,
as the public would not feel that the rules passed by the legislature or executive are
supreme or guiding and would not have confidence in the judiciary to resolve its
disputes. Future rule of law programs would benefit from utilizing public
perception surveys and responding accordingly.

305. GRAMcKOw, MONGOLIA JUDIcIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 40 (indicating that
the Judicial Reform Program is "seen by other donors as the focal point for legal and justice sector
information and more and more as the hub for rule of law coordination").
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But in the context of all of these tangible successes, the human problem
remains in Mongolia. The norms of the rule of law have been introduced, but have
not fully taken root. Judges must embrace the independence of the judiciary, and
lose the culture of complacency of the past - that of following executive directives.
Mongolia's judges are young, competent, and embracing of the ideals of the rule of
law. As the old guard steps into retirement and the young tireless leaders continue
to adopt and accept the notion of the rule of law, Mongolia's judiciary will be what
the Constitution promises, an independent, impartial and equal branch of
government. Although the public is beginning to understand and accept the rule of
law reforms and attribute a heightened status to essential government institutions,
like the judiciary, there remains space for much improvement.
While the government plans effectively have guided the last phase of legal
reforms, there have been difficulties in their implementation. Resultantly, the next
phase of legal reforms intends to concentrate on assistance in implementation of

the recently created laws, institutions, norms and culture. The Judicial Reform
Project's 2004-2008 program focuses on implementation of specific measures of
the Program of the Government of Mongolia, which the Parliament adopted in
November of 2004.306 As well, the USAID states that "[o]ver the next five years,
the challenge for USAID will be to move beyond the "introduction" of these new
approaches and ensure that they are actually "embedded" and "institutionalized"
within the legal profession."307
Overall, the Mongolization of the legal system has not fully occurred yet, as it
is still adjusting to a new legal system and language applicable to a market
economy.

08

The seeds of the rule of law culture are planted, and Mongolia and its donors
continue to look forward to tilling the grounds, to embed these concepts and watch
their offspring grow and stimulate a deep and successful democracy and market
economy.

But this optimism belies Mongolia's serious concern - corruption. The
problem of corruption has far-reaching implications and seriously has affected
Mongolian democracy, its market economy, foreign investment, judicial
independence, public perceptions, and the rule of law. Corruption has caused
renewed and invigorated protests recently. Pro-democracy parties have threatened
to boycott, unless the corrupt leaders step down.30 9 Mongolia's society presently is
colliding over its rampant corruption. Can effective legal and judicial institutions
fully combat corruption? No, but these institutions are a prerequisite to doing so.
306. USAID,

THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS,

LESSONS

LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175.

307. USAID,
MONGOLIA
STRATEGIC
PLAN
2004-2008
40 (2003)
available at
http://pdf.dec.org/pdf docs/PDABY66 1.pdf [hereinafter MONGOLIA STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2008].
308. See WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 154, at 37-38

(discussing problems with Mongolia's legal reforms, as of 2000).
309. Oyungerel Tsedevdamba, Pro-DemocracyActivists in Mongolia Worry about Potential Roll
Back of Reforms, EURASIANET, Nov. 22, 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/
eav112202.shtml.
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Bending the leaders to accept the rule of law is fundamentally a political
exercise, and they must be constrained through domestic bottom-up pressures and
international top-down pressures.
This is true for judges as well as
parliamentarians as well as employees of the executive. It is the psychological
willingness of the judges to rule honestly and professionally, and of high-level
officials to accept living subject to the law. Otherwise, the whole premise is
undermined.
The focus is not only on the leaders. Public perception of corruption has been
very high in all sectors, although in recent years, the public seems to think more
highly of the judicial branch. But the prevalence of corruption has a basic effect
on the mentality of the citizenry, which can undermine a rule of law culture.
The administrative court is a significant catalyst to reducing corruption in
government and constraining leaders through law, but questions abound. Will the
government allow the court full discretion to hear cases and controversies - will it
allow it to be independent? Will the government accept its decisions? Will it hold
itself responsible for its actions? Will the Mongolian citizenry embrace the
concept of the rule of law? Or will they live subject to corruption and engage in
corruptive exchanges, because it is "the only way"? While the passage of time
answers these questions, the Mongolian dream of democracy hangs in the balance.
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APPENDIX A
MONGOLIA'S SOCIALIST TRADITIONS:
INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

After the U.S.S.R, Mongolia became the second nation to embrace
communism, establishing a one-party system and eventually a command economy
administered by five-year plans. 10
The U.S.S.R.'s military and diplomatic
assistance in Mongolia's independence from China initiated an extremely close
bilateral relationship between the two states.311 Although formally independent,
Mongolia became the defacto sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union.3 12 Indeed, of
all former soviet bloc states, Mongolia was the most dependent of Soviet aid and
technical assistance. In the 1980s, Soviet direct aid reached as high as 30% of
Mongolia's GDP, and approximately 40,000 Soviet advisors gave technical
assistance to Mongolia's industrial development, particularly in the mining and
manufacturing sectors. 313 This aid helped Mongolia close its wide trade gap and
increase social services, thus benefiting Mongolian rural society and increasing the
legitimacy of the rule by the communist Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
314
(MPRP).
The beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Council on
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in the 1980s was the principal agitation for
change in Mongolia.315
Mongolian students, like their Eastern European
counterparts, began peaceful demonstrations calling for democracy, and organized
sit-ins and hunger strikes in Sukhbaatar Square, the main square in Ulaanbaatar
where the Parliament is located.316 Math and Physics professors from the
Mongolian National University formed the Social Democratic Party, and
professors from the Economics Department formed the National Progress Party.317
Mongolia's versions of glasnost and perestroika unexpectedly promoted the
democratic reformists' agenda, although the government originally initiated them

310. See Fedor S. Mansvetov, Russia and China in Outer Mongolia,24 FOREIGN AFF. 143, 147-49
(1945-46).
311. Id. at 146-47 (explaining that in return for the 1912 treaty whereby Russia agreed to assist
Mongolian autonomy from the "presence of Chinese troops on her territory [and] the colonization of her
land by the Chinese," Russia gained unfettered rights to railroad construction).
312. CEVDET

DENIZER

&

ALAN

GELB,

MONGOLIA:

PRIVATIZATION

AND

SYSTEM

TRANSFORMATION IN AN ISOLATED EcoNOMY 3 (2005). See also Bradsher,supranote 2, at 548.

313. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 208; Cheung, supra note 10, at 70-71 (detailing the
withdrawal of Soviet assistance and Mongolia's initial painful reforms).
314. See Bradsher,supra note 2, at 545-46. In fact, aid disproportionately influenced Mongolian
welfare, in that herdsmen's standard of living was greatly higher than it would have been without it. In
1970, Mongolian aid far outpaced other developing countries. Id. at 546. Bradsher cites $220 in aid per
capita for Mongolians, in comparison to $4.20 in 80 non-communist countries and $36 in US aid for the
South Vietnamese. Id.
315. See Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 461.
316. Id. at 462-63 (examining the transition period and the elasticity of the MPRP in responding to
the popular demonstrations, after briefly debating whether to respond with force, like the Chinese in
Tiananmen Square).
317. Id. at 463.
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to strengthen the socialist economy, not render it obsolete.318 Under these plans,
moderates in the MPRP were increasingly placed in leadership positions while
Mongolia sought to increase government transparency and performance, by
allowing more autonomy to state enterprises and government ministries.319 In the
end, these moderates were the key factor in the MPRP's decision to allow a
transition to democracy. During glasnost and perestroika, Mongolia began to
establish international relationships with deft speed.320
Economic Background: Initially, Soviet control was largely over Mongolia's
economic system - all of Mongolia's trade was with the Soviet Union from 1921
until 1952.321 During that time, the Soviet Union left Mongolia relatively
undeveloped, as the U.S.S.R. tended to its own nation-building. Mongolia's
economy remained dominated by livestock-raising and nomadism.
Once
appropriately strengthened, however, the U.S.S.R. eventually asserted control over
322
In 1948, the
Mongolia's political and social spheres in addition to its economy.
Soviets introduced economic planning in Mongolia with the first of the five-year
plans, which collectivized herds, built winter animal shelters and wells, and sought
to industrialize Mongolia.323 The plans aimed to stimulate a change from an
agricultural-industrial economy to an industrial-agricultural economy.
The Soviet Union invested substantial sums in developing Mongolia's mining
industry, primarily its copper trade, and in developing light industries within
Ulaanbaatar (translation: red city), such as carpet, wool and shoe factories.324
After the establishment of the CMEA, the Soviet trade bloc, Mongolia's
industrialization reflected the "international Socialist division of labor and the
steady growth of international cooperation between Socialist countries. 3 25 Within
that framework, Mongolia provided meat, hides and other livestock products,
minerals and coal to the Soviet bloc, and imported the balance of other daily
326
necessities.
The government administrated and coordinated all banking,
production, distribution, and social services functions during Mongolia's socialist
era.327
Political and Social Background: The MPRP controlled Mongolia from 1921,
when that party's young revolutionary founder, Sukhbaatar, led the state to
independence from China, with the help of the U.S.S.R.328 Soviet assistance came
318. Id. at 461.
319. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 208-11 (discussing the "renewal" program modeled after
Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts in the Soviet Union).
320. Id.
321. Bradsher, supranote 2, at 548.
322. Id. at 206.
323. Id. at 207; Bradsher, supra note 2, at 549-50.
324. K.L. Abeywickrama, The Marketization ofMongolia, 10 MONTHLYREV. 25,27 (1996).
325. Bradsher, supranote 2, at 550 (quoting former Premier Tsedenbal in 1970).
326. Omar Sattaur, Thoroughly Modern Mongolia, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 1, 1990, at 23. See also
Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 461 (detailing that in the 1980s, Mongolia traded 95% with the Soviet Union,
and the balance with CMEA).
327. See Abeywickrama, supranote 325, at 26-27.
328. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 462.
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hand in hand with Soviet influence, which soon changed into Soviet command,
mainly by directing the MPRP, the governing Mongolian communist party. 329 The
MPRP increased its stranglehold on society until it controlled all aspects of its
citizens' behavior. The MPRP regulated prices.330 It collectivized and controlled
herds. The government managed domestic production and all traffic and supply of
goods. 331 The MPRP controlled foreign trade, and consistently ran trade deficits,
which Russian direct aid closed.332 In terms of human development, the socialist
regime in Mongolia stymied human freedoms.333 The MPRP controlled the media,
and there was no freedom of speech or association.334 There was no opportunity
for private initiative. In short, the Mongolian people were governed, not
governing.
In addition to the communist party, the negdels, the state herding and
agricultural cooperatives, governed Mongolia. 335 They provided veterinary care,
abundant wells, and decreased risk of loss from natural disasters.336 The negdels'
marketing function supplied necessary services - they purchased raw materials at
fixed prices set by the Ministry and transported the products to the state run
processing facilities at set schedules.337 The negdels also established customary
land use rights, controlling concentration of the herds and their grazing within each
negdel as well as among themselves.338
Under the rule of various dictatorships, the Mongolian people suffered
through a period of brutal atrocity.3 39 The state eventually provided its people with
a strong sense of security.
Indeed, Mongolia's development advanced
considerably under communist rule. Economically, society benefited from fixed
prices at home,3 4 0 above market prices for meat, leather, cashmere and copper

abroad,3 4 1 and cheap luxury goods from Eastern Europe.

Socially, educational

329. See id.at 460.
330. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 207.
331. Abeywickrama, supranote 325, at 26.
332. Ginsburg, supranote 2, at 462.
333. Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 206-07.
334. See id.
335. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT MONGOLIA 2003 25
(2003), available at http://hdr.undp.org.
336. See id.at 39.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. See Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 207 (describing the destruction of the lamaseries and
the transformation of the command economy). Mongolia's two dictators are known as the Mongolian
equals of the Soviet versions. Id. Horolyn Choibalsan was "Mongolia's Stalin" for transforming
Mongolia's society with murder and violent purges to rid it of any challenges, killing over 100,000
persons, including Monks, intellectuals and the traditional elite, and causing the near-total destruction
of Buddhist lamaseries. Id. Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal was "Mongolia's Brezhnev" for suffocating
Mongolia's economy through the introduction of command and control characteristics. Id.
340. Id. Fixed prices allowed rural society to purchase goods for the same prices as in Ulaanbaatar,
although the distances to supply rural aimag (provincial) centers was vast. Id.Ultimately, the demise of
fixed prices undermined rural society's well-being and civic participation. Id.
341. See Abeywickrama, supra note 325, at 27. These goods were sold to the U.S.S.R. at prices
fixed at a percentage over world prices. Id.
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improvements were impressive, health services were free, and there was practically
no unemployment.342 Importantly, the government solidified (superficial) gender
equality, social protection, and human security.3 43
Legal Background: Mongolia has gone through various and interrupted legal
systems during its existence as a state. Mongolia's rich legal history originated
from the yassa, Chinggis Khan's legal codification.344 Subsequently, during
Manchu rule over Mongolia, administrative authority encompassed judicial
authority.345 Once Mongolia gained independence from China as a result of the
1921 People's Revolution, the government instituted a mixed Asian and European
legal system. 3 46 Mongolia's legal system during the communist era was based on
the Soviet adaptation of the Roman law system; however, there were no
professional lawyers or judges.347 In 1933, Mongolia reorganized its court system
and vested much judicial power in the executive.348 When the judicial system was
reestablished during communist rule, it was structured primarily as a criminal legal
system. 349 After heavy amounts of Russian funding, a tangible legal profession
emerged.350
Thousands of directives from the MPRP, ordinances of the People's
Representatives Hurals (parliaments) and decisions of the Ministerial Counsel
comprised the rest of Mongolia's legal system.351 Overall, the appropriate
government ministries resolved what problems arose, and there was no need for a
formal civil law system. Negdels and other cooperatives also played a significant
role in the rule of law. Along with aimag (provincial) governors, negdels were the
primary regulators of the rural population, and they settled disputes amongst
themselves, or went to the aimag governor for assistance.352

342. Id.
343. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 336, at 6.
344. M. BYAMBA & MONGOLIAN WOMEN LAYERS ASSOCIATION, HISTORICAL AND CURRENT
OVERVIEW OF THE MONGOLIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM 1 (2005); GEORGE LANE, GENGHIS KHAN AND
MONGOL RULE 37 (2004).

345. Tseveen & Ganbold, supra note 278; Dorothea Heuschert, Legal Pluralism in the Qing
Empire: Manchu Legislationfor the Mongols, 20 INT'L HIST. REV. 310,321 (1998).
346. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 161 (2003).
347. Id.; BYAMBA, supra note 345, at 4.
348. WILLIAM ELLIOTT BUTLER, THE MONGOLIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATION
AND DOCUMENTATION 92-93 (1982). See also The Supreme Court of Mongolia, Judicial System of

Mongolia, http://www.supremecourt.mn/english/index.php?what-system
(giving a broad overview of the history of Mongolia's judicial system).

(last visited Feb. 28, 2010)

349. GINSBURG, supra note 347, at 161.

350. Id.
351. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 4-5.
352. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 336, at 39-40.
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APPENDIX B
MONGOLIA'S REALIZATION OF THE PROCEDURALLY-MINIMALIST RULE
OF LAW:
STEPS TAKEN BY MONGOLIA AND ITS DONOR ORGANIZATIONS
I. REFORM OF LEGISLATION
The first phase of legal reform was the reformation of the Constitution. The
Asia Foundation contributed the most, but there also were independent analyses of
the draft constitution by scholars and professors from the U.S. and Germany.
The next aspect of stage-one reforms was the rewriting of the legal code to create
appropriate rules that govern newly-created market-based relationships.354 To be
consistent with the rule of law formulation described above, any decisions with the
effect of law and any lawmaking should be transparent and should allow for
meaningful public participation. As such, the reforms of the legal code should
result in the passage of fair, equal and nondiscriminatory laws and decisions with
the effect of law.
Construction of a market-oriented economy was the first priority of
Mongolia's newly elected government, which based this transformation on (i)
privatization as the centerpiece, (ii) financial, fiscal and external sector reforms
311
and (iii) removal of controls on prices, tariffs and wages.
Moderate price reforms occurred first, to soften the way for privatization. In
January of 1991, the government freed prices on most non-essential commodities
and increased prices on state subsidized essential items and public utilities.356 An
increase in salaries, a reduction in spending and the budget, and a decrease in
subsidies to most state enterprises rounded out these price reforms.357
The government then privatized state assets under the Privatization Law of
May 1991, which entitled all citizens to 10,000 tugrug (Tg) of vouchers.358 These
citizens could redeem small-value assets under the green vouchers, and shares in
public limited or joint stock companies from large state enterprises under the blue
vouchers.359 Public utilities and key transport, telecommunications and mining
enterprises however, remained under state control. 360 Livestock was privatized to
herdsmen and accommodations were privatized to its inhabitants. 361
The Banking Law of May 1991 reformed the financial sector and created a
new state central bank (its previous version was the sole banking center of

353. See Bilskie & Arnold, supra note 5, at 210 (stating that Mongolia lobbied the U.S. for help in
formulating their constitution); THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 213, at 1.
354. See Bliskie & Arnold, supranote 5, at 211-12. See also infra note 101 and accompanying text.
355. See Goyal, supranote 10, at 635 (discussing the development of the transition period).
356. Cheung, supranote 10, at 70.
357. Id.
358. Goyal, supra note 10, at 635.
359. Id. at 635-36.
360. Id. at 636.
361. Id.
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Mongolia) as well as constructed the basic legal framework for commercial banks
to operate in Mongolia. 362 An unlikely early reform that complemented
Mongolia's financial reforms was the establishment of a stock exchange in 1992,
under the direction of Zoljargal, one of Mongolia's many "brash young
reformers."363 The Foreign Investment Law of May 1994 created the necessary
conditions for Mongolia's entry into the globalized system of investments and
trade, by stipulating the conditions for foreigners to own property and
investments.364
II. REFORM OF THE JUIJCIARY
A. The PresentState of the MongolianJudiciary
Legal Profession: The legal profession is composed of the same four main groups
of professional lawyers as during the socialist period: (i) judges; (ii) prosecutors
representing the state; (iii) advocates who are admitted to practice law, provide
legal advice and represent parties in court; and (iv) notaries, who witness or
authenticate documents.365
Advocates: Previously, the state operated the economy, the social network and the
administration and its officers resolved any arising disputes. Resultantly, citizens
had little need for lawyers and the legal system, unless they were involved in a
criminal case. Now, with increasing citizen rights (property rights, civil rights,
etc.) and the rise of a civil law system, the number of lawyers is growing. The
number of advocates in the Association of Mongolian Advocates (AMA) has
increased from 200 in 1994 to over 500 in 2001.366 In 1995, Mongolia passed the
Law on Advocacy, which delineates the functions of the profession - advocates
may present legal advice, prepare legal documents, participate in investigations,
and may represent clients in court and other administrative organs. 367 Advocates
must be members of the AMA, and to qualify for membership, an individual must
have a law degree, an absence of a criminal record and pass an examination
administered by the AMA and the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs

(MOJHA). 368
Judges: During the communist era, judges historically occupied one of the lowest
governmental levels, and garnered little respect.369 In those times, the MPRP
directly appointed judges and retained and exercised a substantial amount of
oversight. For instance, oftentimes the party recalled judges to explain a decision
to a local party committee where it disagreed.370 Prosecutors traditionally had
more power than judges, and effectively decided cases based on party lines,
362. Id. at 637.
363. Cheung, supranote 10, at 71.
364. Tsedendambyn Batbayar, Mongolia in 1993: A FragileDemocracy, 34 ASIAN SURVEY 41, 44
(1994).
365. Tseveen & Ganbold, supra note 278. This article does not treat notaries in depth.
366. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supranote 224, at 8.

367.
368.
369.
370.

Id.
Id.
See Tseveen & Ganbold, supranote 278.
Id.
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resulting in about a 98% conviction rate before 1991.371 Today however, judges
are gaining more prestige in society, and the Constitution and national legislation
protect their independence. Presently there are approximately 360 judges in
Mongolia, who are appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the
General Council of Courts, and who have life tenures.372 Most Mongolian judges
are very young, between 30 and 35 years old. This result is due to the low age and
experience requirements to be a judge: for the lower courts, judges must be at least
25 years old and have three years legal experience; for the Supreme Court, judges
must be at least 35 years old and have ten years of legal experience.373 At present,
two-thirds of the judiciary's cases are civil, in contrast to the communist period
where nearly all cases were criminal.374 However, judges in Mongolia are
overloaded with cases.3 7 5 On average they settle 350 cases a year- far in excess of
the international average - which "often causes a superficial approach in settling
cases and disputes." 376
Legal Education: As of 2005, there were 31 law schools operating in Mongolia.377
In 2001, approximately 6,000 students attended law school, with half of those
students enrolled in one of the four main universities. 3 78 The Ministry of Justice
and Home Affairs has been planning to audit all law schools to determine their
curricula and the level of expertise and qualifications of the law professors. It is
unclear whether this exercise has been completed. In general, law schools in
Mongolia need a unified curricula standard applicable to all accredited law schools
and elevated standards of entry into the legal profession on the basis of merit,
equality and fundamental fairness.
Judiciary System: Soum, intersoum and district courts are courts of first instance

that handle less serious crimes and civil disputes under ten million tugrug.3 7 9
Aimag (province) and city courts are found in the capitals of the aimags and there
is one specialized court in Ulaanbaatar called the Capital City Court (this is the
equivalent of an aimag court). 38 0 These are also courts of first instance but they
have different jurisdiction than the other courts of first instance.381 Aimag courts
have jurisdiction over more serious crimes, civil disputes over ten million tugrug,
and appeals from lower courts.382 The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over all

371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. ZORIGFOUNDATION, REPORT ON THENATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM 10 (2001).

375. Id. at 8.
376. Id.
377. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA-LEGAL AND JUDIcIAL REFORM PROJECT, REPORT No. PID 10443 5
(2005). See also Worldwide Legal Directories, Schools of Law in Mongolia Directory,
http://www.hg.org/law-schools-mongolia.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
378. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIALEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECT, supra note 378, at 5. The
report identifies that MOJHA provided this information to the World Bank. Id.
379. Tseveen & Ganbold, supra note 278.
380. Id.
38 1. Id.
382. Id.

516

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:3

appeals from decisions of aimag and the Capital City courts as well as jurisdiction
over some matters of first instance.8 In 2004, the government of Mongolia with
the assistance of the World Bank initiated a specialized system of administrative
courts.384 Lastly, there is a Constitutional Court which only has jurisdiction over
questions concerning the constitution.
B. DonorActivity And Structuring The JudicialReforms
Law on Courts: Reforms of the judiciary began modestly with the 1993 Law on
Courts. 385 During the passage of the Law on Courts, The Asia Foundation
provided two legal consultants to work with the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, the Ministry of Justice, and the Parliament.38 6 These consultants were two
Americans - Clifford Wallace, Chief Senior Judge of the Ninth Circuit, and a
specialist from the U.S. Congressional Research Service.387 Between 1994 and
1998 USAID entered its second phase of assistance for Mongolia, and it reported
that this era was marred with energy crises and economic stabilization issues. As a
result, although it paid attention to and engaged in reform programs concerning
democratization and improving legal institutions, short-term emergency
considerations disproportionately diverted its aid away from rule of law
programs.388
C. The ProgressionofMongolia's JudicialReforms
Although the reform process occurred across various fields simultaneously,
this appendix describes Mongolia's judicial reforms by subject matter, for ease of
understanding. This approach paints a cogent picture of the overall path of
Mongolia's judicial reforms, but not necessarily a temporally accurate one.
Judicial Independence: Increasing the political, economic, organizational and
decision-making independence of the judiciary is the first fundamental value of the
parliament's Strategic Plan for the Justice System of Mongolia.389 Judicial
independence is of course a necessary aspect of a procedurally-minimalist rule of
law.
In advance of the legal reform program, The Asia Foundation supported the
Mongolia Group for Independence of Judges and Lawyers (MGIJL) seminar on
judicial independence and ethics. 390 As well, the JRP brought a consultant to
Mongolia - Marie Milks, a retired Hawaii State Court Judge who has had prior

383. Id.
384. See interview with various officials, supra note 278, and accompanying text; THE WORLD
BANK, MAJOR WORLD BANK JUDICIAL REFORM PROJECTS APPROVED AUGUST 2004 1 (2004).
385. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 162, at 2.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. USAID, MONGOLIA STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2008, supranote 308, at 10-11 (summarizing its
prior programs and strategies).
389. Id. at 11 2; WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154,
at 30.
390. See THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supranote 213, at 1.
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experience in Mongolia -in September of 2005 to work on improving judicial
independence.391
Capacity Building of Legal Institutions: Mongolia and its donors have spent a great
amount of money and resources on increasing the capacity of the judiciary and
other legal institutions. One necessary and specific focus has been on reforming
the Judicial Council.
The Judicial Reform Project has focused its assistance on Mongolian legal
capacity building, with particular attention to the General Council of Courts
(GCC), Mongolia's judicial council. The initial priority of the JRP was assistance
in court management and administration, with the goal of increasing transparency,
accountability and judicial efficiency. Throughout its assistance, the JRP did not
impose any of its own ideals on the GCC.392 Rather, it presented the GCC with
comparative background material from other countries with different
administrative and management systems, and aided in the GCC's informed
decisions.393 The JRP supports the GCC in creating a national case information
database and improving its budget expertise. Further, it has assisted the GCC in
making adjustments in its decision-making processes and introducing the use of
sub-committees for better information and broader participation in the GCC's
decisions. 394 In addition, Robert La Mont, then-Chief of Party for the JRP,
personally participated in the GCC's meetings, as a monitoring activity and to
directly impact the GCC's policy making and administrative decisions.3 95
Outside of the GCC, over the last fifteen years, Mongolia has built a
substantial amount of capacity in its judiciary. Mongolia has automated all 61 of
its courts under the JRP's assistance, which includes automated case management
procedures and records, and automated random assignment of cases. 396 More than
three-quarters of the caseloads in Mongolian courts are automated, and almost all
courts have computers, and many with Internet access.397 Mongolia soon hopes to
create a central database for case information on the Internet. After a slight
learning curve, USAID issued and installed generators to back up the computers
when the power goes out, as frequently occurs in the aimags.398
As well, the JRP has assisted each court in creating public information areas
and improving the efficiency of records management processes. The goal has been

391. See Skip Waskin, Judicial Reform Project Update, USAID, Oct. 21, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q4-05.html.
392. See GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 4.
393. Id; See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS,
LESSONS LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 6.

394. Id.
395. See GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 8.

396. USAID, Judicial Reform Project Update, USAID, Aug 5, 2005, http://www.usaid.gov/
mn/programs/jrp/index.html (explaining improvements in judicial independence).
397. See USAID, Case Study, Helping Mongolia to Reform JudicialSector, USAID, Oct. 6, 2009,
http://www.usaid.gov/stories/mongolia/cs mongolia law.html.
398. See Skip Waskin, Mongolia, Judicial Reform Project Update, USAID, July18, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html (explaining court automation).
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to improve transparency, efficiency and reduce opportunities for system
manipulation. The JRP organized court management training to increase the
performance of case flow management of individual courts, to raise the efficiency
and productivity of the bench.399
Further, the World Bank has funded a Unified Information System
link all national level justice sector institutions in Ulaanbaatar to share
make court information available to the public, and make available all
regulations, with the intention of giving courts complete knowledge
judges to rule consistently.400

(UIS), to
data and
laws and
to allow

These reforms have increased judicial efficiency, which in turn assures
fairness, a fundamental principle of the rule of law. As well, these reforms
increase accountability and transparency, to reduce possibilities of corruption and
assure access to the courts for meaningful, fair, impartial and equal redress and
justice.
Training and Continuing Legal Education: Training professionalizes the judicial
system, and has been an extremely important part of Mongolia's rule of law
reforms. In January 2000, the Association of Mongolian Judges, the Association
of Mongolian Lawyers, and the Association of Mongolian Advocates founded the
Judicial Training Center. 401 The Mongolian Foundation for Open Society
(MFOS), which jointly runs the JRP with USAID and PACT, supported the
establishment of the Judicial Training Center through financial and technical
support.402 The Judicial Training Center resides at the Supreme Court. As well,
The Asian Development Bank opened a Legal Retraining Center for Lawyers in
February of 2000.403
III. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE REFORM THROUGH GOOD GOVERNANCE
PROGRAMS

With judicial reforms in place, the Government of Mongolia and its donors
have begun fine-tuning the application of these reforms. While this process
occurs, their joint attention has shifted to good governance reforms, through
increasing transparency and accountability. Mongolia has undertaken many good
governance reforms that donors primarily advance and fund.
Capacity Development of the Office of the President: The UNDP supports the
Office of the President of Mongolia in developing its institutional capacity for
public consensus building and to provide long-term solutions to political and
socio-economic challenges.404 The four core objectives of the project are: (1) to

399. See id. at T 4 (Court Management Training).
400. See GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 16 (stating that
the Judicial Reform Project is assisting the World Bank in networking the courts into the UIS).
401. See Retraining Centre of Judges, Introduction to Judges Retraining Centre of Mongolia, T 1,
http://www.owc.org.mnjrc/English/introduction eng.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
402. Id. at 12.
403. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 6 n. 6.
404. See United Nations Development Programme, Completed Projects, Institutional Capacity
Development of the Office of the President of Mongolia (Jan.2005-Dec. 2007), UNDP, http://www.
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enhance constitutional and legal status of the President of Mongolia, including the
President's inclusive public policy-making powers, (2) improve organizational
development of the Office of the President, including its policy analysis capacity
and human resources management, (3) improve staff performance management
system of the Office of the President, including results based assessment for public
service delivery, and (4) increase responsiveness and transparency / accountability
of the Office of the President, including better connecting the President with the
people and application of tools. 405
Capacity Development of the State Great Hural: The Asia Foundation has a
program on Strengthening the Legislative Research and Analysis Capacity of the
State Great Hural.
Mongolia's State Great Hural (SGH), or parliament, is at the center of the
country's democracy, but possesses little independent capacity to conduct policy
research and analysis. This hinders its ability to play an active role in policymaking
and oversight of the government. 406
The Asia Foundation has focused on creating an independent analytic
capacity for the parliament. It endeavors to go past donor-driven demands to
create local demand. In order to achieve this, The Asia Foundation has worked to
increase transparency in governmental and legislative processes, so that
nongovernmental organizations and civil society have a role in influencing the
legislature.407 The Asia Foundation supports improving the quality of policy
research capacity, and advances the notion that civil society may be able to
increase that capacity.408 This "may be a linchpin reform that will lead to more
demand for information, more transparency, and better quality information. But the
current situation of low transparency provides a core structural constraint to the
development of more analytic capacity." 409
Finally, the Asian Development Bank has been assisting Mongolian
governance reforms on a more macro level. ADB has undertaken a country
governance assessment which highlights the importance of public sector reform
and strengthening the government's institutional capacity.410
Legal Professional Qualifications: In addition to training of existing judges,
prosecutors and advocates, Mongolia has been revamping its legal professional
qualifications. The reformation of legal education meets two fundamental goals:
creating predetermined standards that all graduates must meet; and coordinating

undp.mn/dghr-icd.html.
405. Id.
406. THOMAS B. GINSBURG, STRENGTHENING LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS CAPACITY
OF MONGOLIA'S STATE GREAT HURAL 3 (2005).

407. Id. at 5, 17.
408. Id. at 8.
409. Id. at 3.
410. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, MONGOLIA COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAM UPDATE 20042006 4 (2003) (showing the relatively large size of Mongolia's public sector and the high public sector
wages in proportion to GDP).

520

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 3 8:3

legal education to ensure that all law schools teach substantially the same subject
matter.
The Mongolia Legal Needs Assessment Report indicated that legal education
needs drastic improvement. The quality of the courses and testing is inadequate, as
the "faculty is basically confined to teaching the relevant chapters of the Civil
Code and limited to recitation of the provisions of the passed laws." 4 11 The report
calls for a new methodology, which concentrates on developing critical and
analytical thinking, to understand and debate the rationale behind the law, and not
just to memorize and know the provisions of the law.412 The Soros Foundation has
supported curriculum development and the development of textbooks, and donated
funds to the Ulaanbaatar Metropolitan Central Library to establish a specialized
public law library.413 While Mongolia and its donors have begun curriculum and
systemic reforms in the Mongolian legal education, they leave much to be desired.
As a third prong of legal educational reform, the creation of a required bar
examination will ensure that established minimum standards are met by all legal
graduates. The JRP assisted in the creation and administration of the first
qualification exam for legal professionals (bar exam) given by the Ministry of
Justice and Home Affairs. 4 14 As of 2005, there have been two exams. 415 There
were some major problems in the first qualification exam; however, the report on
the second Lawyer Qualification Exam, offered in 1995, showed that the exam was
conducted fairly and openly and that grading mistakes were corrected and being
investigated.4 16
Bar Associations: Mongolia does not have a functioning bar association. The
Mongolian Advocate's Association regulates advocates, but not government legal
advisors, prosecutors or judges.417 It functions to represent the interests of only its
advocate members. Accordingly, to cure this deficiency, the JRP is assisting the
Mongolian Advocates Association's efforts to become a full Bar Association, with
two main functions: monitoring of member ethics; and training of member skills.
Ethics in the Legal Profession: Because of Mongolia's socialist legal traditions,
judges have not understood the concept of conflict of interests, and a majority of
judges has met with significant resistance the work that donors have done in this
field. Judges maintain significant personal relationships with the participants of
cases, parties and witnesses, and (in part because of this) judges are prone to

411. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 32.

412. Id. at 7.
413. See id. at 33 (lamenting also the lack of adequate study and research textbooks and teaching
materials).
414. See GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 2
(demonstrating JRP's seminal role in contributing to the drafting of the legislation that created this
exam, and its assistance in drafting the exam questions and ensuring secrecy).
415. Skip Waskin, Mongolia, Judicial Reform Project Update, USAID, Aug. 18, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html.
416. See Waskin, supranote 302, at 2.
417. See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LAW AND POLICY REFORM: DEVELOPING MONGOLIA'S
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS: A NEEDS ANALYSIS 39, 1 3 (1995).
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financial and personal influence.41 8 The JRP also has recognized that the
communication culture of judges is very low. 419 The JRP provided advice on the
Judicial Ethics Code and the draft Law on Courts.420 Jack Marshall has taught
ethics courses in an interactive and enthusiastic environment, and the participants
have indicated that they actually changed their behavior as a result of these
workshops.421 Professor Marshall continues to work with the Judicial Disciplinary
Committee to fine tune the recommended changes to the Judicial Ethics Code and
helps improve procedures for investigating and prosecuting violations.422
Public Education and Awareness: Public opinion surveys have shown that
confidence in Mongolia's legal institutions has been low. 42 3 The JRP developed a
variety of public outreach and information programs, including a television
program that presents changes in the criminal code.424
PACT administers the public education campaign for the JRP. PACT
conducted focus groups to gauge their awareness levels and then developed themes
and content for the public education campaign. 4 25 The result was its production in
collaboration with the German Technical Corporation of a TV drama series,
Huuliin Tsag, which informed people of the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure
codes.426 More importantly, it provided practical knowledge on how to exercise
rights by showing how the courts work and demonstrating the independent rule of
law.427 At the time, this series was the most watched program on Mongolian
television. 4 28 After success with the television program, the JRP created a radio
drama with the same subject matter and purpose, to reach Mongolia's rural
population.429
To manage public information about the judiciary, JRP has created a Public
Access website which will put all case information on the web. This is occurring
despite the reservations of some judges.430

418. GRAMCKOw, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supranote 264, at 24 (stating also that
judges are careless in court sessions and are too bureaucratic).
419. Id. at 24.
420. See id. at 17, 22.
421. Id. (emphasizing that future lawyer qualifications examinations must include the subject of
legal ethics).
422. Id.
423. See USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 9-10.
424. Id.
425. See PACT, Judicial Reform Program, http://www.pactworld.org/cs/judicial reform (last
visited Feb. 11, 2010).
426. USAID, THE JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM IN MONGOLIA: ACCOMPLISHMENTS, LESSONS
LEARNED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, supranote 175, at 38.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. See Judicial Reform Project Update, National Center for State Courts, http://www.usaid.gov/
mn/programs/jrp/jrp-updates-Q3-05.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010). (Although not stated, publicizing
the case docket prevents the shifting of cases between judges, and this may be one reason for their
reservations, since they are known to reassign cases frequently. Reassignment of cases to "interested"
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Public Media Education: Mongolia has not had a long tradition of independent
media, and journalists during the socialist-period mostly reiterated and reported the
government line. 431 They have not had a tradition of impartiality and critical
thinking. 432 In addition to its public outreach, PACT maintains the JRP website,
and conducts training for public affairs and public information officers and
journalists, to improve the depth and quality of the media, which plays a vital role
in monitoring and public awareness.433
IV. INCREASING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND ACCESSIBILITY THROUGH LEGAL
AID PROGRAMS AND NGOs
Legal Representation and Accessibility: With the advent of a market economy,
Mongolia has had to increase its citizens' accessibility to the courts. Many of the
access to justice problems focus on access to information. However, in many
cases, there is not sufficient personal access to legal representation.
For instance, due to inefficiencies in the system, free legal assistance has not
been fully used by citizens charged with crimes. A key underlying cause of this is
likely to be a shortage of well-trained lawyers. Until October 2002, for instance,
there were only 390 certified advocates in the country, of whom only 21.0 percent
were located outside Ulaanbaatar. There were fewer than five advocates in most
aimags. Bayan-Olgii and Govi-Altai aimags had just one advocate each. While the
number of lawyers has increased with the holding of qualification examinations for
lawyers in 2002, the concentration of lawyers in Ulaanbaatar has also continued to
increase.434
Under their Rule of Law Program, MFOS undertook a legal education
program that supported the Law School of Mongolian State University's efforts to
start a legal clinic to provide free legal aid to indigent clients, under the
supervision of law professors and attorneys. 435 MFOS had previously assisted the
Shikhikhutug private law school's establishment of a legal clinic. 43 6 MFOS
supports a project that provides free legal aid and psychological consultancy to
prisoners of juvenile and women's prisons.437

judges has resulted in charges of corruption and bribe-taking and the JRP and civil society has clamored
for rules controlling and monitoring reassignment of cases).
431. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 5 (assessing the
past traditions of the media in Mongolia, and stating that impartial public awareness and public
monitoring of the justice system is "not always mastered even in advanced democracies").
432. Id.
433. See Amartya Sen, Speech at the World Bank Legal Conference: What is the Role of Legal and
Judicial Reform in the Development Process? (June 5, 2000), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/legalandjudicial.pdf (discussing how an active and free
media can do much to advance the rule of law).
434. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 336, at 17.
435. M. ICHINNOROV, ET AL. & SOROS FOUNDATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: ACCESS TO A FREE
LEGAL AID (NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, MONGOLIA) (2002), available at http://www.soros.org.mn
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MFOS also has a new initiative, an Access to Justice Project, which promotes
right-based justice reform.438 MFOS intends to create a new justice system with
the cooperation of state and non-state actors. 439 This entails linking legal clinics,
human rights NGOs and private law firms to provide effective legal assistance to
all of society, with a focus on vulnerable groups. This MFOS program focuses on
the creation of an adequate fee structure and a budget for a mandatory legal
defense system and legal assistance to the indigent.4 0
Lastly, MFOS' Freedom of Information Project aims to increase access to
government information and raise public awareness and active participation. In
1998, MFOS assisted the creation of the Legal Resource Center with the
Ulaanbaatar Metropolitan Library to increase access to legal information and
research materials by creating a centralized law library for law students, lawyers
and other professionals and the general public.441
Alternative Dispute Mechanisms: Improving access to justice through the creation
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or formalization of traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms increases the ability to achieve meaningful redress.
The Asia Foundation has supported legal mediation and research on
traditional dispute resolution to deal with social developments - such as the
herding communities' disputes over traditional pastureland use. The Asia
Foundation is documenting traditional conflict resolution practices on a
comparative basis to identify the changes in the pastureland use and the effects of
economic and political transitions, to increase and improve the resolution of these
disputes.
Likewise, the JRP has worked with the Foreign Trade Arbitration Court of the
Mongolian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Mongolian Advocates
Association to organize training on arbitration principles, case resolution at the
arbitration court, and mediation and involvement of state courts in the court
procedures.442
Strengthening the Role of NGOs as Civil Society: Nongovernmental organizations
assist in the advancement of the rule of law by advocating on behalf of individuals,
interest groups or causes, to influence governments to take action, usually through
the promulgation of legislation or legal reforms. International nongovernmental
organizations play a complementary function by drawing attention to
governmental violations of the rule of law. These organizations, like the UNDP or
the World Bank, widely disseminate detailed reports, which actually influence
governmental action.

438.
4 39.
440.
441.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

442. GRAMCKOW, MONGOLIA JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAM, supra note 264, at 23 (discussing a
lack of donor coordination in the arbitration field, and stating that the JRP will focus on creating a
combined donor strategy as it has in the legal education field).
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As well, domestic nongovernmental organizations can advance the rule of law
by exerting bottom-up pressures. Foreign donors in Mongolia have done a
formidable job at stimulating the role of domestic NGOs and increasing their
influence in communications with the Mongolian government.
The Asia Foundation's program on nongovernmental organizations aims to
expand and strengthen citizen decision-making and relationships between rural
NGOs, government and business to improve governance.443 In that regard The
Asia Foundation assisted in the passage of the NGO law, which has given
nongovernmental organizations a robust freedom to operate in Mongolian
society.444 As well, The Asia Foundation has supported the work of numerous
NGOs (primarily women's rights and family rights organizations) and citizen civic
outreach programs. 441
Specifically, The Foundation built the Center for Citizen Education, which
has a rural outreach program.446 It also has supported the Mongolian Women's
Lawyer's Association with technical assistance, in their efforts to develop a
judicial advocacy program to advance women's rights, by filing test cases in key
areas of discriminatory practices.447 Resultantly the Mongolian Women Lawyers
Association has raised public awareness of laws and regulations, published
handbooks on legal topics and undertaken legal training programs.448
V. POLICE, PROSECUTOR,

AND PRISON REFORMS

The police system, the state prosecution system, and the prison system all can
impact the rule of law. They principally affect meaningful access to justice and
procedural standards. These three systems should be reformed to prevent
interference with the establishment of a procedurally-minimalist rule of law.
Mongolia has not ignored these structures. Rather, Mongolia actively has been
reforming the police, the prosecutor's office and the prison system.
Prosecutor Reforms: The JRP assists the Office of the Prosecutor General. The
JRP formed a special prosecutor's office focusing on judicial corruption - the
General's Special Investigation Unit - which investigates crimes by justice sector
officials. 4 49 The JRP provided specialized training from a U.S. prosecutor with
experience in corruption, and provided equipment to the Prosecutor General.450
The JRP has been developing a joint procedural manual for prosecutors and
investigators, which will ensure compliance with international standards for human
rights and provide uniform implementation procedures and enhanced coordination
443. See THE ASIA FOUNDATION, STRENGTHENING MONGOLIA'S NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS (2000). See also THE ASIA FOUNDATION, WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN
MONGOLIA (2000).
444. THE ASIA FOUNDATION, supranote 162, at 1.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. WORLD BANK, MONGOLIA: LEGAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supranote 154, at 38.

449. Judicial Reform Program, Ethics in the Legal Profession, http://www.usaid.gov/mn/programs
/jrp/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2010).
450. Id.
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among justice sector institutions. As well, the JRP has begun to automate the
prosecutor's office to link the work of the prosecutors with the administration of
the judiciary.
Penitentiary Reforms: MFOS has worked in the criminal justice system, in support
of penitentiary training. MFOS is assisting the Penitentiary Department to
establish a long-term, sustainable training structure for corrections officers. In
addition, MFOS lends support to a pre-trial detention centers monitoring project
implemented by the Center for Human Rights and Development. 451 This project
investigates human rights abuses in detention centers and publicizes them to the
general public. MFOS has supported the establishment of community service
sentencing, which is a provision of the new Penal Code.452
Arrest and Detention Reforms: Many organizations, domestic and international,
work in the reformation of arrest and detention. The JRP assisted in developing
arrest and detention joint regulations, and then used these regulations to make
recommendations on the Criminal Procedure Code.453 UNDP also engaged in
arrest and detention reforms. As well, the National Human Rights Commission
made significant headway in securing the constitutional rights of those who are in
arrest and detention situations.454
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454. The National Human Rights Commission is beyond the scope of this work, but does affect the
rule of law in that it has helped to create fair procedural standards and meaningful access to justice. For
more information on this, see the National Human Rights Commission website, available at
http://www.nhrc-mn.org; the National Human Rights Status Report 2003, available at http://www.nhrcnu.org/docs/Annual2003StatusReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); and United Nations
Development Programme, UNDP Current Projects, Democratic Governance, Capacity Development of
the National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia, http://www.undp.mn/dghr.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2010). The UNDP Capacity Development of the NHRC is also supported by NZAID. NZAID, New
Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency, http://www.nzaid.govt.nz/programmes/c-timorleste.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010). This project provides technical assistance to the National Human
Rights Commission of Mongolia to enhance Mongolia's capacity to promote and protect human rights.
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